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The relationship between self-enhancing attributions and 
superior comparison of self to others was examined and the 
effects of need for social approval on these behaviors 
investigated in a 2 X 4 factorial design. Additionally, all 
subjects provided scores on two measures of social 
desirability (Self Deception and Other Deception). Specific 
questions examined were: (1) Does varying the nature of 
audience (anonymous, self aware, aware of others, aware of 
observers) affect attribution of success/failure? (2) Is 
self-other comparison affected by change in audience 
awareness? (3) What relationship exists between 
self-serving attributions and tendency to see self more in 
conformity with norms than one sees others to be? (4) How 
are self-serving attributions and superior self comparisons 
related to needs for social approval? One hundred and ninety 
two subjects were assigned to one of eight conditions 
(audience level X successs/failure feedback on task). Each 
subject was asked to make attributions regarding 
internal/external responsibility for o n e ’s own performance 
and to compare himself to others on ability to perform the 
task. Furthermore, each subject was requested to complete 
the Self Deception Questionnaire and the Other Deception 
Questionnaires. The present study failed to show 
self-enhancing attributions for performance, but did show 
some evidence of superior self comparison, and a trend to 
increase superiority of self comparison as ambiguity of 
comparison group increases. Nature of the audience was not 
found significant in influencing the degree to which self- 
serving biases and superior comparison of self are made. No 
relationship was established between the tendency to make 
self-enhancing attributions and tendency to make superior 
self comparisons. Results employing analyses of variance by 
median split of variables of social desirability were mostly 
inconclusive. However, an unexpected main effect for gender 
was found on the Self-Deception and Other-Deception 
Questionnaires.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
Definitions of Self and Related Terms
The ’’self" is an aspect of humanity which has intrigued 
man for centuries. Baldwin (1889) claimed that St. Augustine 
(345-340 A.D.) was among the earliest to investigate the 
self. Impo rtant nineteenth and twentieth century 
investigators of self theory include James (1890), Cooley 
(1902) and Mead (1934). Raimy (1943) has been credited by 
many with first coining the term "self-concept", a term now 
c o m m o n  in books, texts, magazines articles and general 
conversation .
Currently, scores of theories and definitions of self 
are found in the literature. Be tween 1948 and 1968 over two 
thousand articles were written on various aspects of 
self-concept (Gergen, 1971). Moreover, self-concept is only 
one of the more popular self-prefixed terms employed to 
identify or describe some aspect of self. Other widely 
accepted terms include "self-esteem" (Maslow, 1954), 
"self-actualization" (Goldstein, 1940), "self-acceptance" 
(Allport, 1961) and "self-identity" (Erickson, 1959).
Many researchers have recognized that self terms are
1
2
nearly impossible to differentiate. Wylie (1974) pointed out 
that "The terms are so intertwined and overlapping in the 
literature that the constructs must be discussed as a group" 
(p. 40). "In fact," s t a t e d  R o s e n b e r g  (1979), "in a 
scientific field generally undistinguished by the precision 
of its terminology, the 'self' stands as a concept foremost 
in the ranks of confusion" (p. 5). "Because of the lack of 
agreement about self terms, many educators and researchers 
use various self terms and [their] as sessment instruments 
interchangeably" (Calhoun, 1977, p. 318). Therefore, as this 
pa p e r  p r o p o s e s  to deal w i t h  a n u m b e r  of s e l f - related te r m s ,  a 
discussion must take place to define the meanings of those 
t e r m s .
Self-concept. "Self concept," said Calhoun (1977), 
"refers to how an individual perceives himself in terms of 
ability, value, worth, limitations, etc. The self concept is 
the substantive description one employs to identify his 
nature, and is also used by individuals to compare themselves 
to others" (p. 319). The self-concept, as viewed by Rogers 
(1947) refers to "the sum total of all the characteristics a 
person attributes to himself and the positive and negative 
values he attaches to those characteristics" (p. 146). 
Self-concept as defined by Rogers requires a perception and 
interpretation of self characteristics, a viewing of self as 
object (Mead, 1934).
The self-concept is not present at birth but develops
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ov e r  time. "W h e n  p e o p l e  are a s k e d  h o w  they k n o w  that they 
possess certain characteristics, a typical answer is that 
they have learned them from other people" (Schrauger and 
Schoneman, 1979, p. 549). The works of Baldwin (1889), James 
(1890), Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) also suggested that the 
responses of others have an influence in shaping self-concept 
definitions for self. Cooley's theory of the "looking glass 
self" (1902) asserts that one's self-concept is a reflection 
of one's perceptions of how one appears to others. In 
viewing the self as an object, the "individual experiences 
himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the 
particular standpoints of other individuals of the same 
social group or from a generalized standpoint of the social 
group as a whole" (Mead, 1934, p. 138). This shaping of 
self-concept through the impressions of others begins early. 
It is thought by some authors (Perkins, 1975; Wylie, 1979) 
that the self-concept develops prior to age five and remains 
basically constant throughout life.
S e l f - e s t e e m . Self-esteem involves an additional 
component not yet discussed. Where the self-concept is 
primarily descriptive in nature, self-esteem includes a 
strong evaluative element. Rosenberg (1965) stated: "Self
esteem is a positive or negative attitude toward an object, 
namely the self" (p. 30). Elder (1961) described self-esteem 
further as "feelings of personal worth...influenced by the 
performances, abilities, appearance and judgments of
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significant others" (p. 258). Lest the reader become 
confused, it must be explained that the "positive and 
negative values" referred to above by Rogers in describing 
self-concept differ from the self valuation process described 
here. One can say, for example, "I am a smoker. This is a 
habit which I see as a part of my self concept. I feel this 
habit is bad, harmful. This is a negative aspect of my 
character" (self-concept). Such a statement is not the same 
as saying, "I am a a smoker. Smo king is bad, harmful. Other 
people do not like smokers. Therefore, because I smoke I am 
bad, harmful, of little worth" (low self-esteem).
Self-esteem appears to develop after the self-concept. 
"Once the individual has established a concept of himself, he 
is able to determine whether or not he is satisfied with what 
he sees about himself, thus self esteem can be judged" 
(Cal houn, 1977, p. 321).
As with self-concept, self-esteem seems to be strongly 
related to the attitudes and values others hold toward the 
individual. Elder (above) referred to these others in his 
definition of self-esteem, stressing their importance to the 
concept. Cooley (1902) also indicated the importance of 
others in the development of self-esteem: "In the presence of 
one w h o m  we fee l to be of i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e r e  is a t e n d e n c y  to 
enter into and adopt, by sympathy, his judgment of ourselves" 
(p. 175).
Unlike the self-concept, which is s o mewhat stable,
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self-esteem is seen to fluctuate ( C o o p e r s m i t h , 1959; Gergen,
1971; Wylie, 1974) as individuals face self-defeating
circumstances or negative evaluations from others. However,
self-esteem is not as unstable as one might suppose, for
global self-esteem
is based not solely on an assessment of ...constituent 
qualities but on an assessment of qualities that 
count...Some disposition or social entity elements rank 
high in our hierarchy of values, stand at the center of 
our feelings of self w o r t h - w h e r e a s  others are relegated 
to the periphery (Rosenberg, 1979, pp. 18-19).
Hence, only those circumstances wherein critical self values
are challenged appear to seriously affect o n e ’s level of
self- esteem positively or negatively.
Idealized s e l f -concept. The idealized self-concept is 
an imaginative construct created in the mind of every 
individual, against wh ich he measures himself (Rosenberg,
1979). Such a construct includes all the ideally desired 
self attributes the individual wishes for himself. Such an 
image may be a social-cultural stereotype or may have 
resulted from exposure to role models, readings, etc. The 
idealized self-concept is not how the individual sees himself 
but h o w  he w o u l d  like h i m s e l f  a c t u a l l y  to be, a goal t o w a r d  
which to strive.
S e l f - e n h a n c e m e n t . The concept of self-e nhancement 
(Rose, 1966), also labeled as egotism (Snyder, Stephan, & 
Rosenfeld, 1976), self-serving bias (Bradley, 1978) and 
egocentricism (Schlenker & Miller, 1977) is defined here as
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follows: Self-enhancement is the tendency to make 
attributions regarding oneself and o n e ’s actions that put the 
self-concept in the best possible light, i.e. "by taking 
credit for good outcomes and denying responsiblity for bad, 
the i n d i v i d u a l  m a y  be able to e n h a n c e  or p r o t e c t  his self 
e s t e e m "  (Bra dley, 1978, p. 56).
Baumeister (1982) saw self-enhancement as resulting from 
one or both of the following self-presentational motives: (a) 
the need to please a specific audience (impression 
management) and (b) the desire to be seen by self and others 
as congruent with or similar to one's idealized self-concept 
(self-construction). In his 1982 article, Baumeister cited 
nine areas of research in social psychology where 
self-enhancement concerns appear to affect the outcome of 
one's actions.
Two areas of self-enhancement research are of special 
importance to research proposed by the present author, i.e., 
attribution and social comparison research. There has been 
much wor k done related to self-enhancement in the area of 
attribution research. Good review articles of the work in 
the attribution area have been done by Miller and Ross (1978) 
and Bradley (1978). In these works, self-enhancement is 
discussed as demonstrated when individuals make internal 
attributions for own positive behavioral outcomes and 
external attributions for own negative behavioral outcomes.
Self-enhancement has been important also in the area of
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social c o m p a r i s o n . Rose (1966) stated that self-enhancement 
occurs when the self is represented as superior to others. 
Codol (1975) saw self-enhancement as a phenomenon which 
accounts at least partly for a tendency to compare oneself to 
others and find oneself as superior in comparison. Bo w e r m a n  
(1975) suggested that self-enhancement is a factor in two 
classes of behavior:
(a) comparison projection: Comparison projection is a 
phenomenon similar to that mentioned by Rose above in which 
self compares with others to find itself superior in some way 
to others.
(b) reference projection: Reference projection is a slightly
different phenomenon wherein individuals show tendencies to 
assert, when forced to confront negative self-traits, that 
they are equal in this trait to others of their reference 
group, making them only "one of the crowd". Others have 
reported similar findings (Bramel, 1962; Friend & Gilbert, 
1973).
As is seen, self-enhancement is a concept which has been 
used to describe a variety of behaviors. However, little 
research to date explains how such behaviors might relate to 
one another. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the 
relationships among some of these behaviors.
Self-serving bias. Self-serving bias is a term coined 
by Bradley (1978) to indicate self-enhancing causal 
attributions. This term will be used interchangeably in this
8
paper wit h the terra self-enhancing attribution.
Superior conformity of s e l f . Superior co nformity of 
self is a construct denoting a type of social comparison 
where the self is represented as being superior to others, 
i.e., when individuals claim that one's own behaviors, 
traits, characteristics, etc. more closely resemble that of 
the idealized self-construct than do the behaviors, etc., 
demo nstrated by others. As discussed above, this phenomenon 
can be viewed as a type of self-enhancement. Superior 
conformity of self can be differentated from self-esteem in 
this way:
When we characterize a person as having high self 
esteem, we are not referring to feelings of 
superiority...: we mean rather, that he has self
respect, considers himself of worth...The person with 
high self esteem has philotimo, not hubris; he does not 
necessarily consider him self better than others, but 
neither does he consider himself as worse (Rosenberg, 
1979, p. 4).
Self-enhancing Attributions: Theory and Research
Since one's ideas include what "ought to be" and "what 
one would like to be" as well as "what is," attributions 
and cognitions are influenced by the more subjective 
f o r c e s  of n e e d s  and w i s h e s  as w e l l  as by the m o r e  
objective evidence presented in the raw material 
(Heider, 1958, pp. 120-121).
One is inclined to attribute to oneself good things, 
but one s u f f e r s  w h e n  one has to a t t r i b u t e  to o n e s e l f  
some thing that is not so good (Heider, 1976, p. 16).
The central focus of attribution theory in general is
the search to identify rules by which individuals attempt to
infer causes of events which they observe around them.
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Attribution theory arose from the study of person perception. 
Fritz Heider was an important early theorist in the area 
(1958). Heider's theory was concerned with the relationship 
between phenomenal causality— the underlying or antecedant 
conditions that give rise to a perceptual experience, and the 
perception of social objects and events. In Heider's 
thinking, a social occurrence (object or event) will not be 
perceived by an observer in factual or objective fashion but 
will be interpreted in consonance with the o bserver’s past 
experiences and present needs.
These perceptual processes, Heider speculated, serve two 
functions: (1) to form a coherent understanding of the events 
around us, and (2) to predict and control events through this 
understanding. In the process of explaining events which are 
witnessed, the naive observer constructs and uses his/her own 
individual predictive theory of human behavior. Such "naive 
psychology" permits the formation of judgments about the 
extent to which the behavior of the observed individual is 
being guided by internal dispositional factors, external 
situational factors or a combination of both. Furthermore, 
according to Heider, an individual's selection of a causal 
attribution will be guided by his/her own needs and 
expectations as a person. The operation of a self-serving 
motive in attribution processes can be seen as a logical 
result of a preference to explain our behavior in the best 
possible light, given our need to maintain self-esteem and
10
control over our environment.
Others have noted the association between need of 
individuals to gain control over their environment and 
attributions. According to Kelley (1971), "The attribution 
to self of success and the attribution to external factors of 
failure provides for the continuation of control attempts"
(p. 23). The social psychological theory of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957) can also be viewed in terms of 
efforts to maintain cognitive control through attribution 
assignment. By resolving cognitive dissonance through 
strategies as discussed by Festinger (1957), individuals are 
able to explain past behavior and feel more confident about 
future behavior, therefore maintaining cognitive control.
A substantial body of literature has investigated the 
interdependence of cognition and motivation. This research 
has demonstrated a tendency for individuals to make 
self-attributions for own positive behavioral outcomes and 
external attributions for own negative behavioral outcomes 
(e.g., Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Arkin, Gleason, & 
Johnston, 1976; Beckman, 1970; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; 
Forsythe & Schlenker, 1977; Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, &
Johnson, 1974; Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Wieby, 1964; Luginbuhl, 
Crowne, & Kahan, 1975; Miller, 1976; Schlenker, 1975; Sicoly 
& Ross, 1977; Stevens & Jones, 1976; Streufert & Streufert, 
1969; Weary, 1980; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Wolosin, Sherman, & 
Till, 1973; Wort man, Constanzo, & Witt, 19 73). The operation
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of self-esteem motives, or self-enhancing biases, as 
hypothesized by Heider (1958), and elaborated empirically by 
others has generally been used to explain these results.
That is, as discussed in definitions above, "by taking credit 
for goo d ac t s  and d e n y i n g  b l a m e  for bad o u t c o m e s ,  an 
individual may be able to enhance or protect his self esteem" 
(Bradley, 1978, p. 56).
Information processing model of a t t r ibution. Other 
interpretations of the research in this area have been 
made. Miller and Ross (1975), in their review of the 
research in this area, suggested that little evidence clearly 
supports a motivated attribution bias interpretation. These 
authors examined much of the research in the area and 
proposed an explanation of this phenomenon which stresses the 
expectancies of the subject. They discuss these findings as 
instances in which a subject strongly anticipates success. 
That is, when efforts of an individual produce an anticipated 
successful outcome, a perception of self control results, 
thus producing internal attributions for the performance. 
Alternatively, when a discrepancy between expected 
and actual outcomes is evident, the individual attributes 
his/her performance to external factors. In this 
interpretation of the data, expectancies would predict the 
assignment of internal/external attributions in the same 
manner as does self-enhancement.
Miller and Ross (1975) suggested that a logical
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processing of information model rather than a self-enhancing 
model would better suit the results of studies cited in 
support of the self-enhancing bias. According to these 
theorists, the discrepant attributions for success and 
failure outcomes arise from three nonmotivated tendencies in 
information processing: (1) a tendency to expect success more 
than failure and to assign expected outcomes to internal 
causes, (2) a tendency to identify more covariation between 
behavior and outcomes in the case of increasing success than 
in constant failure, and (3) a tendency to erroneously base 
judgments of contingency between response and outcomes in 
terras of the occurrence of the desired outcome (i.e., 
success) rather than by any actual degree of contingency.
A number of studies have been designed to examine this 
question of expectations and contingencies (Arkin et al., 
1973; Feather, 1969: Feather & Simon, 1971a, 1971b; Federoff 
and Harvey, 1976; Fitch, 1970; Stevens & Jones, 1976; Weary, 
1980; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). The earlier studies, on which 
Hiller and Ross based their thinking (i.e., Feather &
Simon, 1971a, 1971b, Fitch, 1970, and Weiner & Kukla,
1970,) did appear to show evidence that causal attribution 
follows an information processing model. However, subsequent 
research, controlling for covariations of success, 
expectations, etc., has indicated that subjects made 
self-serving attributions regardless of expected outcomes 
(Arkin et al., 1976; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Sicoly & Ross,
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1977; Weary, 1980). The information processing explanation 
is difficult to rule out completely simply because people do 
seem to have some expectancy schemata regarding success and 
failure on tasks in general. However, this alternative 
explanation can be disputed when studies are designed to 
control for an expected outcome, i.e., by using novel tasks, 
altering expectations of success/failure with instructional 
sets, etc. (Arkin et al., 1976; F e d e r o f f  & H arvey, 1976).
Self-serving model of attribution. In response to Miller 
and Ross's article of 1975, Bradley (1978) published a 
further review of the empi rical evidence of the field. In 
this article she argued against Miller and Ross's model of 
assigning attributions and for a broadened reformulation of 
the self-enhancing model. Bradley suggested that situations 
are important determinants of self-serving bias and that 
people appear to assign responsibility for the outcomes of 
their actions with a view to their public self-presentation 
in mind. Others too have argued the importance of 
situational determinants in self-enhancing attribution 
(Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977; Rose, 1966; Schlenker, 1975).
These researchers have found that several rules concerning 
situational variables generally hold true. It appears that 
the liklihood and magnitude of the self-enhancing effects are 
greater when:
(1) concerns for self-esteem are likely to be aroused (when 
potential for e m b a r assment or negative evaluation might
14
exist), e.g. public performance, perceived wide 
allowance for choice, unexpected negative outcome, high 
importance of trait or skill for the individual (Arkin 
et al., 1976; Bradley, 1978; Hakmiller, 1966a; 1966b: 
R o s e , 1966).
(2) subjective rather than objective measures of attributes 
are utilized (Rose, 1966).
(3) ambiguity or variance in evaluations of individuals by 
others exist (Sherwood, 1967).
(4) observer is unfamiliar with a c t o r ’s history (Forsyth & 
Schlenker, 1977).
(5) future events are seen as unlikely to invalidate actors' 
claims about self (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977;
Schlenker, 1975).
(6) when subjects are objectively self-aware (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Schlenker,
1980) .
The advantage of B radley’s formulation, i.e., 
self-serving bias model rather than information processing 
model, is that it appears to explain the failures of previous 
research to demonstrate a self-enhancing effect (Arkin et 
al., 1976; B e c k m a n ,  1973; H a r v e y  et a l . , 1 9 7 4 ;  Ross, 
Bierbauer, & Polly, 1974). In reviewing these research 
studies Bradley suggested that what actually occurred was a 
reversal of typical self-serving attributions, i.e., taking 
responsibility for failures and denying responsibility for
15
successes, in the service of appearing more modest to the 
subjects' perceived audience. In other words, she 
hypothesized that a self-presentation motive was still in 
place for subjects in these studies, but it operated by 
taking into account what presentation subjects perceived 
would be considered most acceptable by the specific audience 
present. Another important aspect of Bradley's theory is 
that it implies that one's public self-presentation may have 
implications for one's private perception of causal 
attribution. That is, if individuals are motivated to 
maintain a self-enhancing publi.c presentation to establish 
and sustain the esteem of others, it seems possible that this 
motive is also related very closely to private self-esteem 
and one's perceptions of self-adequacy. Questions can begin 
to be asked about how public self-presentation and private 
self-evaluation processes are interrelated.
Information processing versus self serving bias. Miller 
(1978) wrote a rebuttal to Bradley's at tempt at reformulation 
of the self-enhancement model, in which he criticized both 
aspects of Bradley's formulation discussed above. First, he 
criticized as over-inclusive her endeavor to explain 
attribution reversal patterns as self-enhancing presentation 
strategies. Miller argued that a theory which could explain 
an actor's acceptance of either more or less responsibility 
for action as self-serving was not a useful explanatory 
device. Secondly he charged Bradley with confounding the two
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separate psychological processes by considering private and 
public attributions to be aspects of a single continuum. 
Miller distinguished between a person’s private perception of 
causality and the public description of such, judging these 
to be two separate aspects of the attribution process, the 
former of which Miller judged to be the more significant 
p h e n o m e n o n .
Bradley, now married and publishing under the name of 
Weary (1979), responded to Miller's criticism by clarifying 
conditions under which causal attributions would be expected 
for self-presentation purposes. In defense of her treatment 
of public versus private causal attributions, Weary responded 
that there may be many points during the attribution process 
at which bias could occur. The evidence is minimal, she 
stated, to support the conclusion that private perceptions 
rather than public descriptions of causality are affected by 
self-enhancing motivation. On the other hand, the extent to 
which public presentations may later affect personal 
perceptions of causality is unknown. Her belief was that 
biased response strategies should be the central concern of 
current research.
The argument between Miller and Weary has been joined 
on both sides by theorists attempting to develop theoretical 
explanations of the self-enhancement phenomenon. Several 
authors have made efforts to develop theoretical explanations 
of the self-enhancement phenomenon which address these
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issues. Such theoretical explanations can be divided 
generally into two opposing schools of thought. The first 
s c h o o l  s u b s c r i b e s  to w h a t  is k n o w n  as a t h e o r y  of the "self 
esteem motive" (Rosenberg, 1979; Sherwood, 1967). A number 
of theorists agree that self-enhancement is a behavior 
engaged in to maintain or to increase individuals' amount of 
self-esteem. Jones and others (Gergen, 1971; Jones, 1973) 
are of the opinion that self-enhancement behaviors serve to 
confirm, maintain or increase individuals' feelings of 
personal satisfaction, self-worth and effectiveness. Such 
behaviors thereby maintain or increase self-esteem in 
providing an exemplary image of self to self. These 
behaviors may function to protect the self from acknowledging 
unpleasant self-truths (Secord & Backman, 1964; Snygg &
Combs, 1949). As such, self-enhancement occurs primarily for 
private rewards, i.e., high self-esteem is in itself 
pleasurable and rewarding.
Other theorists see self-enhancement slightly 
differently. These theorists could be described as 
self-presentation theorists (Weary & Arkin, 1980). Schlenker 
(1975; 1980) describes self-e nhancement as an impression 
management behavior designed to gain social approval or avoid 
social disappproval. Rose (1966) hypothesized that a demand 
for self- enhancement exists in social life. In other words, 
society requires a presentation of respectable selves and 
demands that an individual maintains such a self in social
interaction. As a result, individuals are forced to role 
play or ’’dramatize" a self-confident, competent self in order 
to achieve social approval and acceptance, and thus maintain 
or increase self-esteem. Self-enhancement then becomes a 
type of public presentation or act (Goffman, 1959). The 
argument between these two theoretical viewpoints has not 
been clearly resolved.
Recent research in self serving bias models of 
attribution. Since the Weary and Miller debates, a number of 
studies have been conducted to clarify aspects of self- 
serving bias. As was predicted by Weary, several studies 
have found that subjects are more likely to demonstrate 
self-enhancing behaviors under public than under private 
conditions (Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Reiss,
Rosenfeld, Milburg, & Tedeschi, 1981; Weary, 1980; Weary, 
Harvey, Perloff, Schweiger, & Olson, 1979). Other studies 
have confirmed that focus of self-awareness plays an 
important part in making self-serving attributions (Bergen & 
R o d m a n ,  1983; Hull & Levy, 1979; R e i s s  et al., 1981).
Another segment of research has looked at personality 
variables and the ways in which these affect self-enhancing 
phenomena (Arkin et al., 1980). A fourth area of study has 
investigated the relationship between making self-enhancing 
attributions and subsequent emotional states (Jones, Berglas, 
Rhodewalt & Skelton, 1981; Weary, 1980). The important 
unifying characteristics of all these studies are that the
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findings support the predictions made previously by Rose,
Schlenker and Weary above and the results of these studies
seem to fit better with a self-enhancing rather than
information processing model of causal attribution.
Furthermore, some of these studies appear to show an
interaction of self-esteem and self-presentat ion motives
(Jones et al, 1981; We a r y ,  1980).
An Aspect of Social Co mparison Theory: Superior
Conformity of Self
As discussed above, aspects of self-enhancement
phenomena have been studied not only in attribution research
but in m a n y  o t h e r  a r e a s  i n c l u d i n g  the a r e a  of s o c i a l
comparison. Thus, it should not be surprising to see
attribution and social co mparison processes joined in
a further investigation of self-enhancement phenomena:
A fundamental com m o n a l i t y  between social comparison 
theory and attribution theory is that both discuss 
phenomena that grow out of a c o m m o n  human need. That is 
the need, discussed by Heider (1944), for the individual 
to or d e r  and p r e d i c t  his e n v i r o n m e n t  so that he can act 
effectively in it and m a x i m i z e  his outcomes. Whereas 
attribution theory discusses the general rules that the 
individual follows in order to make attributions of 
causality that facilitate the prediction of objects and 
persons, social comparison theory considers the 
interpersonal processes that are involved in the 
individual’s efforts to evaluate his predictions about 
objects and persons (his opinions) and his predictions 
about his capacity to act effectively with respect to 
these entities (his abilities)...(Goethals & Darley, 
1977; p. 262).
It should be intuitively obvious that self-enhancement 
phenomena, like self-esteem, derive from comparison with some
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criteria. Without a standard with which to compare, no one
can differentiate his characteristics or decide if his
traits, etc., are greater, lesser, similar to or different
from anyone else*s. Goethals and Darley speak to this issue
in their further discussion of the c ommonalities between
attribution and social comparison theory:
In addition to their co m m o n  basis in people's needs to 
order and predict their environment and their own 
behavior in that environment, both theories emphasize 
that one's perceptions of the adequacy of his opinions 
and abilities is determined by comparing himself with 
other people. This emphasis is explicit in social 
comparison theory. We evaluate our abilities by seeing 
how our performances compare with other people's 
performances. We evaluate our opinions by seeing 
whether others agree or disagree...(Geothals & Darley, 
1977; pp. 262-263).
The present study addresses how these comparisons are made.
Research studies of self- enhancement are by no means new
in social comparison literature. A review of this literature
suggests an early interest in various aspects of self-other,
self-ideal comparisons (Blake & Mouton, 1961; Fillenbaum,
1961; Hinckley & Reth i n g s h a f e r , 1951; James, 1890: Marks,
1943; Reeder, Donohue, & Biblarz, 1960). Although not
referred to in the literature as self-enhancement at that
time, these studies show many similarities of variables
investigated. More recent studies in this area include
investigations by Bo w e r m a n  (1975), Codol (1975), Friend and
Gilbert (1973), Gruder (1971), Hakrailler (1966a, 1966b), Rose
(1966), Singer (1966), and Thornton and Arro wwood (1966). A
good review of the literature in this area, with particular
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attention to how it relates to attribution theory in general 
appears in a book by Suls and Miller (1977), entitled Social 
Comparison P r o c e s s e s .
Leon Festinger has been the primary theorist in the area 
of social coraparsion and it is from his theory that most of 
the studies above derived. Festinger presented a formal 
theory of the workings of social comparisons (1954).
According to him, "There exists, in the human organism, a 
drive to evaluate his opinions and abilities" (Hypothesis I, 
1954, p. 117). Moreover, in evaluating these opinions and 
abilities, people seek objective criteria, what Festinger 
calls physical r eality. However, in the absence of objective 
criteria against which to measure, individuals will seek out 
other people as sources of information, i.e., social reality. 
Additionally, in seeking out evaluations of abilities, people 
have a preference for what the examination should reveal 
(Suls, 1977). People not only want to know how well they 
have done in some area but that they did indeed do well. 
T h e s e  t w o  g o a l s  are e x p l i c i t  in the n o t i o n  of a 
unidirectional drive upward for abilities postulated by 
Festinger (Hypothesis IV, 1954, p. 124, "There is a 
unidirectional drive upward in the case of abilities which is 
largely absent in opionions".). Thus it has been inferred 
that two motivations underlie the making of social 
comparisons. Thornton and A r rowwood (1966) refer to these as 
self-evaluation and self-enhancement.
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Further, according to Fe s t i n g e r ’s theory (1954), "The 
e x i s t e n c e  of a d i s c r e p a n c y  in a g r o u p  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to 
o p i n i o n s  or a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  lead to a c t i o n  on the part of 
[individual] m embers of that group to reduce the discrepancy" 
(Hypothesis III, Derivation D, p. 124). Therefore, according 
to Festinger, because individuals have a unidirectional 
upward drive to improve abilities, each member will be 
motivated to improve his or her abilities either behaviorally 
or perceptually. This can be seen as a problem of 
self-evaluation and self-enhancement. Festinger hypothesized 
that both needs could be fulfilled if the individual improved 
to the point that he was slightly better than other members 
of the group. But as is obvious, not everyone can be 
slightly better than everyone else. How this d i l e m m a  might 
be solved has been addressed in the writings of French 
psychologist, Jean Paul Codol (1975).
Superior conformity of self. Although not well known in 
the United States, Codol's wor k with the superior conformity 
of self concept has further contributed to our knowledge in 
the subarea of social comparison research traditionally known 
as self-enhancement. His conceptualization of the phenomenon 
is interesting and worthy of examination by those who wish to 
further understand the process of self-enhancement.
The superior conformity of self concept is defined by 
Codol as follows:
For a given set of individuals there is generally a
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strong tendency for each one to assert that he conforms 
m o r e  c l o s e l y  to the n o r m s  p r e v a i l i n g  in this set (as 
norms are perceived or experienced) in the whole than do 
other participants. The greater, the degree of 
normativeness, the stronger will be this tendency (Codol, 
1975, p. 463).
Codol also refers to this phenomenon as the primus inter
pares— first among peers or equals or PIP effect for short.
However, the term PIP (acronym) effect is a convenient
linguistic distortion. The superior conformity of self
phenomenon does not really consist of presenting oneself
without exception as the first in the group. This would
indicate a superlative description. It more accurately
consists of presenting self as more than others which is a
comparative not a superlative self-description.
In his writings, Codol (1975) discusses the two
concepts, self-enhancement and superior conformity of self
and e x p l a i n s  h o w  he sees t h e m  to differ:
In the light of results obtained in preliminary 
experiments, it was plausible to view the superior 
conformity of self phenomenon as a simple manifestation 
of the well known self-enhancement phenomenon.
In our opinion, although [based on more research] 
self e n h a n c e m e n t  is a c o m p o n e n t  of the PIP effect, it 
would be inaccurate to perceive the two phenomenon as 
identical. Strictly speaking, self enhancement refers 
only to the process whereby subjects attribute to 
themselves features that are positively valued. Hence, 
it does not imply, inherently, any co mparison to others, 
or a fortiori, any denigration of others in comparison 
to self. (Many studies even tend to show, on the 
contrary, that self enhancement and enhancement of 
others goes hand in hand, cf. Wylie, 1961). However, 
the existence of a co mparison process between oneself 
and others is a crucial feature of the superior 
conformity of self hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, by tending to present oneself as being more 
in conformity with social norms than others, each
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individual enhances himself not only in terms of those 
norms, but also in terms of others (p. 481).
With these words, Codol created a new distinction not
previously made, separating the self-presentational aspect
(see Baumeister, above, p. 6) from the social comparison
aspect in self-enhancement. Such a distinction implies that
two processes may occur simultaneously:
a) a claiming of congruency to social norms or idealized 
self-concept for self (ego serving self-presentation 
seen in attribution research as described above)
b) a self-other comparison process in which individuals are 
biased to see themselves in a flattering way with regard 
to others (labeled as Superior Conformity of Self by 
C o d o l ) .
The advantage of Codol's distinction is that it gives a 
more complete conceptualization of the phenomenon known in 
attribution and social comparison theory as self-enhancement 
which takes into account both self-presentation and 
self-comparison processes. Codol's conceptualization of a 
difference between self-presentation behavior and self-other 
comparison leads one to speculate about how the two relate to 
one another. It is the purpose of this study to investigate 
this relationship.
A history of research of the superior conformity of self 
effect. A review of the history of Codol's work may help 
increase the reader's understanding of his viewpoint. The
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PIP effect was accidentally discovered by Codol in 1959. At 
that time, Codol was performing an experiment designed to 
determine ways in which conception of task requirements 
affect actual task behavior in groups (cited in Codol, 1975).
During an experiment in group cooperation, each member  
demonstrated a notable tendency to consider himself or 
herself more cooperative than he/she saw the other m embers of 
the group to be (more cooperative in fact than external 
criteria showed individuals to be). In a later related 
experiment, Codol (1972) found similar results, i.e., where 
creativity or methodism was the operating norm, each group 
member tended to regard self as more creative or methodical 
than h e / s h e  s a w  ot h e r  m e m b e r s  of the g r o u p  to be.
Curious about these findings, Codol performed a series 
of studies to describe the nature of this effect. In 
preparing to investigate this area thoroughly, Codol mapped 
out three areas of focus for study (Codol, 1975):
(1) Effects on self-other comparisons by type of reference 
group employed (real groups or abstract, imaginary 
g r o u p s ) ;
(2) Effects on self-other comparison by norms (type of norm, 
i.e., factual or desirable; applicability of norm, i.e., 
for concrete i mplementation or as a guideline; 
formulation of norm, i.e., formulated by subject or 
imposed by researcher); and
(3) Effects on self-other comparison by manner in which
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comparison is conducted (number in sample to be 
compared; familiarity with others; direct or a 
posteriori comparison).
From this conceptualization, Codol proceeded to conduct
his research in groups or topic sets. Before a review of the
studies is presented, it seems important for the reader to
become familiar with two terms: norms and reference groups.
According to Codol (1975),
The manner in which each individual compares himself to 
o t h e r s  is a f u n c t i o n  of the s o c i a l  n o r m s  w h i c h  p r e v a i l  in 
the situation simultaneously involving himself and others 
(p. 458).
Further, a norm can express both:
(1) a factual situation that is customary (ordinary, 
regularly occurring in a majority of cases) in a 
social entity (group, society) or in a given 
situation. We shall designate this a 'factual1 
n o r m .
(2) An ideal situation that ought to prevail. Whether 
it s e r v e s  as a goal or mo d e l ,  a n o r m  in this sense 
has social value within the fra m e w o r k  of a given 
culture. We shall call this a desirable norm
(p. 459).
As conceptualized by Codol,
In bo t h  c a s e s  we are d e a l i n g  w i t h  o b j e c t s  that ha v e  a 
social value from a certain point of view. It is 
perfectly obvious that this social valuation is derived 
from different sources and has a different meaning for 
factual and desirable norms. But this makes no 
difference here at all since our hypothesis established 
a relation between the way each compares himself to 
others and social norms irrespective of the type used 
(p. 460).
A reference group, referred to by Codol briefly as a 
"set of individuals sharing a type of c o m m o n  characteristic"
(1975, p. 462), can be further elaborated as any group to which
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the individual belongs or would like to belong, and which he
or she uses as source of norms or behavioral standards (Baron
& Byrne, 1984). Moreover, Codol (1975) states that:
These sets of individuals...may represent the outcome of 
a purely cognitive categorization process...which has 
only imaginary or symbolic reality or they may represent 
a concrete material reality (p. 460).
Let us return to Codol's research to see how these 
concepts are used by him. In the first set of studies, the 
nature of normative expectations was explored. Codol 
discovered that, regardless of reference group, type of norm 
or type of comparison used, the following statement holds 
true: The more normative a given item or trait is considered 
by the subject for the reference group, the more this subject 
tends to state that this item or trait characterizes h i m ­
self/herself more than others (series of studies cited in 
Codol, 1975).
A second set of studies conducted by Codol in 1975 
reviewed the effects of conflicting norms on subjects. In 
these studies, task instructions were subtly manipulated to 
switch task norms (cooperative to competitive or vice versa) 
midway through group problem solving tasks. This mid-task 
switch resulted in a conflict of task expectations for 
subjects (cited in Codol, 1975). The findings of these 
studies show that when conflicting norms are present in group 
tasks, s u b j e c t s  refer to the n o r m s  m o s t  r e l e v a n t  at any one 
time in adoption of PIP effects. An interesting side note to 
the research in conflicting n o r m s — when a norm of competiton
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was established for group members, individuals were resistant 
to declaring themselves as more competitive than their 
fellows. Codol hypothesized that a general cultural value 
"condemning" competition influenced group members. He warns 
that studies of PIP effects should take into consideration 
cultural as well as situational norms (Codol, 1975). The 
research of Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1970) yielded 
similar results. Their study indicated that subjects try to 
present themselves in the most socially acceptable light and 
manipulations which force a subject to choose between what is 
socially acceptable and what the experimenter wants them to 
demonstrate are likely to meet with failure.
A third series of studies by Codol examined the effects 
of generalized other versus specific other as a comparison  
standard. The studies give evidence that PIP increases when 
generalized rather than specific others are used for 
comparison (studies cited in Codol, 1975).
Theory behind the PIP effect. After revi ewing the 
findings of such studies, Codol further explained the PIP 
effect as a conflict between two elements, i.e., the desire 
to please and the determ ination to preserve one's identity. 
That is, first, individuals are seen to assert their 
conformity to norms prevailing in their reference group in 
order to present a favorable image of themselves and thereby 
gain approval and maintain self-esteem. Second, and 
simultaneously, because of this need to display conformity to
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the reference group in order to be accepted, reference groups 
might be experienced as a source of anxiety by everyone.
Such groups may present a pressure to conform which makes 
them seem capable of violating personal identity and 
diminishing self autonomy. Superior conformity of self 
seems, according to Codol, the only way to preserve oneself 
as different from others without infringing on one's 
conformity to social norms or sacrificing self-esteem (Codol, 
1975) .
What is the significance of Codol's theory of social 
comparison? First of all, Codol's theory of superior 
conformity of self appears to explain what factors may cause 
Festinger's unidirectional drive upward to evaluate abilities 
(Festinger, 1954), or at least better explains how such a 
drive might work. Much research has been directed toward 
demonstrating this unidirectional drive, but no one has 
offered an explanation for its existence previously.
Second, Codol's theory emphasizes and clarifies the 
roles that social norms and self-other comparison play in 
helping the individual make causal attributions for success 
and failure in social situations. Internal or external 
causal attributions for success and failure may well depend 
at least in part on the type of social norm(s) in place at 
the t i m e  as w e l l  as the i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  to the no r m ( s )  by 
the individual involved.
Third, research findings s t e m m i n g  from Codol's
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theoretical f r amework in social comparison show some 
interesting similarities to previously discussed findings in 
the self-enhancement attribution research area. Like Bradley
(1978) and Schlenker (1980), Codol saw individuals as needing 
approval from others in order to maintain self-esteem. Also, 
Codol reported that by increasing self-esteem issues, i.e., 
importance of norm present, one can increase the extent to 
which the individual shows himself in a positive light. That 
is, the more anxious the individual is to be seen as socially 
accepted in some situation, the more likely he is to claim 
self-superiority over others regarding relevant norms, within 
certain limits. This parallels findings in attribution 
research where claiming of responsibility for success and 
denying of responsibility for failure seems to vary in 
predictable ways which depend on the social motives of the 
i n d i v i d u a l .to maintain social approval and self-esteem. 
Similarly, Codol found that ambi guity in self-other 
comparisons increases the liklihood of superior conformity of 
self coraparisions, just as ambiguity in the evaluations of 
individuals by others increases the liklihood of 
self-enhancing evaluations on success and failure tasks. 
Therefore, considering these similarites, it seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that PIP effects ought to covary in a 
predictable manner with self-enhancing attributions. No 
research has appeared in this area to date.
A disadvantage of Codol's theorizing is his failure to
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address public versus private aspects of self-presentation as 
it affects his theory. In other words, if the PIP effect is 
due to a need to p r e s e n t  a f a v o r a b l e  i m a g e  of self to o t h e r s  
in order to gain social approval, as discussed above by Rose 
(1966), Schlenker (197 5) and Weary-Bradley (1978) above, then 
in anon ymous conditions this effect should be reduced or 
eliminated, just as it is predicted that internal/external 
attributions for success/failure will be less self-enhancing 
in conditions of anonymity.
In regard to the variable of social approval, Codol did 
report findings from one study. In a study of 90 college 
students, comparing measures of PIP and M M P I  scores, he found 
a strong tendency for superior conformity of self to be 
associated with a drive to present self in a favorable light. 
He also found a tendency for inferior self-comparison which 
appeared to be associated with an absence of desire to 
present self in a positive social light (cited in Codol,
1975). He does not discuss this finding, however, either in 
terms of trait qualities such as need for social approval or 
in self-presentational terms.
Need for Social Approval
As previously discussed, it is possible that 
self-enhancement and superior conformity of self phenomena 
are public self-presentations aimed at gaining social 
approval from others (Bradley, 1978; Codol, 1975; Forsyth 
and Schlenker, 1977; Rose, 1966). Other theorists appear to
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see these behaviors to be a more private self-presentation,
aimed at maintaining one's own positive view of self, rather
than at seeking approval from others, although approval
seeking might be a secondary motive (Gergen, 1971; Heider,
1958; Secord & Backman, 1961; 1964). To understand
self-enhancement attributions and superior conformity of self
comparisons fully, one must come to understand what conscious
or unconscious motives cause the behaviors. The present
study proposes to answer the question "Are self-enhancement
phenomena and PIP effects the result of public
self-presentation, private esteem m a i n t a i n a n c e , or a
combination of both processes?" In order to answer this
question a review of the developments in the study of need
for approval is needed.
Early research in the area of social des irability. The
concept of social desirability has been a topic of study
since 1953, when Edwards (1953) first reported a correlation
of .87 between scaled social desirability of an item's
content and the frequency with which the item is endorsed.
Early in this research, the concept of a need for social
approval was a rather vague and general one, characterized . by
the term social desirability. An early definition by Marlowe
and Crowne, 1961 states:
Social desirability [is a concept which] refers to a 
need for social approval and acceptance and the belief 
that this can be attained by culturally acceptable and 
appropriate behaviors. In a psychometric situation, a 
high need for social approval would be inferred from a
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person's attributions of culturally approved statements 
about himself and the denial of culturally unacceptable 
t r a i t s  (p. 109).
The p e r s o n  less m o t i v a t e d  by a need for s o c i a l  
approval might, in a testing situation, acknowledge 
certain symptoms, reject them as personally irrelevant, 
or present other test responses, depending on such 
factors as the strength of his present needs, the kind 
of responses required and the nature of test stimuli 
(pp. 109-110).
Social desirability, as a term, became the label for the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  of need for social approval, based on the idea 
that the given social desirability or attractiveness of a 
word or trait is that which causes individuals to endorse or 
disclaim it. Therefore, studies purporting to measure need 
for approval were referred to as social desirability or need 
for approval studies. Instruments designed to measure such 
constructs have been known as social desirability 
i n v e n t o r i e s .
The early research in this area viewed social 
desirability as a response set, or "a conscious or 
u n c o n s c i o u s  d e s i r e  on the part of a r e s p o n d a n t  to a n s w e r  in 
s u c h  a w a y  as to p r o d u c e  a c e r t a i n  p i c t u r e  of h i m s e l f "
(Rorer, 1965, p. 133). Such studies related social 
desirability "set" to performance on psychological 
inventories (Bendig, 1959; Edwards, 1953; Edwards, Diers, & 
Walker, 1963; Messick & Jackson, 1962) and to various aspects 
of clinical populations (Wahler, 1958). A weakness in this 
early research was the lack of adequate measures to determine 
the actual, presence or absence of traits, characteristics, or
symptoms that are denied by the individual. Clearly, a need 
for social approval would not necessarily be implied by the 
failure to attribute socially disapproved characteristics to 
self when these characteristics are not actually descriptive 
of the individual.
Later research in the area began to conceptualize social 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  as not m e r e l y  a test t a k i n g  b e h a v i o r  but as a 
pervasive personality characteristic (Growne & Marlowe, 1961, 
1964; Crowne & Strickland, 1961; Dixon, 1970; Mosher, 1965; 
Strickland & Crowne, 1962). The concept of social 
desirability was studied in terms of motivation of subjects 
to dissemble on personality inventories and the relevance 
of this motivation to behavior in other nontest situations 
(Allison & Hunt, 1959; Crow ne & Marlowe, 1964; Mosher, 1965; 
Strickland & Crowne, 1961; 1962). New scales were developed 
to measure need for approval'. These instruments were 
designed in such a way that endor sement of a socially 
desirable item was at the same time the endorsement of an 
item highly unlikely to occur in a normal population 
distribution (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Dickens, 1963). 
Therefore, a high score in one of these scales served to 
indicate a need to seek approval rather than an endorsement 
of real traits or behaviors. Two excellent reviews of the 
literature in this area are Brannigan (1977) and McGee 
(1962).
The studies in the area of social desirability have
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shown need for approval to be associated with the following 
behavioral dimensions as discussed by Brannigan (1977):
(1) Sensitivity-Subjects high in need for social approval 
are highly responsive to positive and negative social 
reinforcers in conditioning paradigms (Crowne & 
Strickland, 1961; Dixon, 1970; Marlowe, 1962).
(2) C o n f o r m i t y -Subects high in need for social approval show 
greater conformity to situation and peer expectations 
(Horton, Marlowe, & Crowne, 1963; Klein, 1967;
Strickland & Crowne, 1962).
(3) Defensiveness-Subjects high in need for social approval 
tend to repress or deny information presented to them, 
when such information contains unfavorable evaluations 
or creates a situation in which the subject must 
engage in self denigrating behaviors (Allison & Hunt, 
1959; Barthel & Crowne, 1962; Block, 1962; Feder, 1963; 
Mosher, 1965; Strickland & Crowne, 1963; Taylor,
1970).
Changes in the direction of need for approval r e s e a r c h . 
More recently studies in this area have tried to 
differentiate more adequately what need for social approval 
actually entails. One approach has focussed on attribution 
and denial responses to self report items. (Millham, 1974; 
Millham & Jacobsen, 1974). Attribution responses involve 
claiming socially desirable characteristics for self; denial 
responses involve denying that undesirable characteristics
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apply to self. Several factor analytic studies of the 
W a r l o w e - C r o w n e  Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960) were conducted to determine if subscales of attribution 
and denial items tapped different constructs (Millham, 1974; 
M i l l h a m  & Jacobsen, 1974; Jacobsen et al., 1977). The 
findings indicated that attribution and denial co mponents are 
equivalent measures of the same construct (Spearman Brown 
correlations showed .85, .89; Kuder Richardson 20 was .90 for 
the entire test; Ramanaiah & Martin, 1980; Paulhus, 1984).
The case for separate attribution and denial co mponents in 
social desirability ratings appears weak.
Another approach to analyzing socially desirable 
responding focusses on distinguishing self-deception, where 
the respondent actually believes his/her own positive 
self-report, from impression management, where the respondent 
consciously seeks to represent him/herself in a favorable 
light. This distinction was discussed in early articles by 
Frenkel-Brunswik (1939) and Meehl and Hathaway (1946). More 
recently Sackheim and Gur (1975; 1978) have referred to this 
distinction as self deception and other deception.
This two factor model of socially desirable responding 
has been linked to a number of factor analytic studies 
showing that social desirability scales tend to cluster 
around two distinct factors: A l p h a , a factor representing a 
unconscious bias in self reports, and G a m m a  a factor showing 
deliberate falsification of self reports (Block, 1965;
37
Wiggens, 1964). A good review of the literature in this area 
was recently published by Paulhus (1984).
Self report instruments designed specifically for 
measuring self and other deception have recently been 
developed by Sackheim and Gur (1975; 1978). The Self- 
Deception Questionnaire (SDQ) and the Other-Deception 
Questionnaire (ODQ) are rationally developed scales, each 
containing 20 Likert scale items. The SDQ items are 
statements judged to be universally true but psychologically 
threatening. The ODQ items are questions about socially 
desirable but statistically infrequent behaviors. Convergent 
and divergent validity of the scales have been demonstrated 
in a series of experimental and correlational studies (Gur & 
Sackheim, 1979; Paulhus, 1982; Sackheim and Gur, 1978; 1979). 
Reliability is about .81 (Sackheim & Gur, 1979). Studies 
conducted by Paulhus (1984) show that the items on these
scales are much better represented by the two factor model of
self-other deception than by the attribution denial model. 
When SDQ and ODQ were factor analyzed with other measures of 
social desirability, i.e., Edwards SD scale and the 
M a r l o w e - C r o w n e  scale, the self-deception/i impression 
m anagement model more accurately represented the factors of 
the SDQ and ODQ than did the attribution/denial model. 
Moreover, of the six scales investigated in the third part of
Paulhus's study, the ODQ was the best marker of impression
management in the exploratory factor analysis conducted, and
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the SDQ was the best marker of self deception. Furthermore, 
many individual items from the SDQ and ODQ were the highest 
loading items on their respective factors (Paulhus, 1984).
F u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  wa s  c o n d u c t e d  on the ODQ and SDQ by 
Paulhus (1984). He found that the ODQ, constructed to 
measure impression management behaviors, was highly sensitive 
to changes across public versus private disclosure 
conditions. The ODQ showed significantly higher scores in 
public than in anonymous conditions. The SDQ or self 
deception measure was not found to show much difference 
across public or anonymous conditions. Paulhus concluded 
that by using the ODQ and SDQ scales, separate reliable, 
valid measures of impression m a n agement and self deception 
can be obtained for each subject.
Returning to the Mari o w e - C r o w n e  Social Desirability Scale 
(1960) for a moment, Paulhus found in his factor analytic 
studies that this scale loaded strongly on both self 
deception and impression management factors. This dual 
loadings pattern has been found in prior studies of factor 
analyses of the Marl o w e - C r o w n e  Scale (Edwards & Walsh, 1964; 
Liberty, Lunneberg, & Atkinson, 1964; Wiggens, 1964) and 
confirms that this scale taps both aspects of social 
desirability responding.
As discussed by Paulhus and others (Brannigan, 1977; 
Paulhus, 1982; 1984), the M a r l o w e - C r o w n e  Scale has 
demonstrated behavioral correlates more clearly than any of
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the other social desirability scales previously developed 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Millham and Jacobsen, 1978; 
Strickland, 1977). It is possible that both impression 
management and self-deception tendencies are necessary to 
demonstrate need for social approval behaviors and the 
M a r l o w e - C r o w n e  Scale has shown that it taps both tendencies. 
Paulhus discussed the usefulness of having two separate 
s c a l e s  (as the SDQ and ODQ) w h i c h  i n d e x  the t w o  c o m p o n e n t s  
separately but which can be combined to provide a single 
index of social desirability responding (Paulhus, 1984). 
Because these two scales lend themselves to this possibility, 
they were chosen for use in the present study.
How are the factors of self-deception and other— 
deception related to the present study? First, if 
self-enhancement attributions and superior conformity of self 
comparisons are manifestations of impression management 
phenomena, designed to gain social approval, direct positive 
relationships should be found to exist between ODQ scale 
scores and each of these behaviors engaged in by subjects in 
the study. Second, if self-enhancement attributions and 
superior conformity of self comparisons are manifestations 
of a private need to maintain positive self-esteem, then 
strong positive relationships should be found to exist 
between SDQ scale scores and each of these behaviors engaged 
in by subjects, and, in addition, little change should be 
seen in these behaviors in varying public and anonymous
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conditions. Third, if as Paulhus has speculated, SDQ and ODQ 
measures can be combined to measure need for approval, 
examinations of the correlations between the two scale scores 
taken together and the other behaviors of interest may 
lead to further know ledge about the relationships between 
these variables. Such information may allow conclusions to 
be drawn about subjects' other characteristics, based on what 
is currently known regarding those who show high need for 
social approval.
Self-Awareness; Research and Methodology
In the discussion of self-enhancing attribution research 
above, several references were made to findings which 
suggested that focus of self- awareness affects the manner in 
which self-enhancing attributions are made. Research has 
indicated that individuals' behaviors depend on which of two 
states of self-awareness predominates at a particular moment 
in time (See Arkin et al., 1980; Bergen & Rodman, 1983; Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Hull & Levy, 1979; 
Wicklund, 1975). Duval and. Wicklund (1972) proposed that two 
states of self-awareness exist: objective and subjective.
Ob jective self-awareness corresponds to the m̂ e state; "When 
attention is directed inward and the individual's 
consciousness is focussed on himself, he is the object of his 
own awareness-hence 'objective' self-awareness" (Duval and 
Wicklund, 1972, p. 2). Sub jective self -awareness corresponds 
to the !_ state: "When attention is directed away from himself
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he is the 'subject' of the consciousness that is directed 
toward external objects, thus the term 'subjective' self 
awareness" (p. 2). Duval and Wicklund proposed that a person 
can be in only one of th e s e  s t a t e s  at any m o m e n t ,  a l t h o u g h  
one's awar eness can change rapidly back and forth between 
s t a t e s .
According to Duval and Wicklund, self-focus produces 
comparisons within the individual of self versus ideal self 
behaviors and states, because the individual's focus is on 
self. Such comparisons lead to positive or negative 
affective states, depending on the individual's perception of 
the self versus ideal self comparison. Such states result in 
motivation to ma x i m i z e  pleasant and min i m i z e  unpleasant 
feelings, therefore resulting in self-enhancing causal 
attributions in cases where individuals are faced with 
positive or negative feedback regarding own performance.
Hull and Levy (1979) have an alternative explanation of 
how objective self-awareness operates. According to Hull 
and Levy, when people are in a state of objective 
self-awareness, they are more sensitive to self-relevant 
aspects of their environment, including the evaluative 
aspects of their behavior. They focus on how their actions 
will look to others and show concern for their appearance 
before real or imagined audiences. It appears in Hull and 
Levy's formulation of the problem that objective 
self-awareness produces a noticeable social perspective to
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categorize and evaluate self. As might be predicted from 
either explanation of the phenomenon, research devoted to 
study of self-enhancing attributions has found that by 
inducing an objective state of self-awareness, subjects tend 
to increase their tendencies to take responsiblity for 
positive outcomes and deny responsibility for negative 
outcomes. Such an effect has been found to be more 
pronounced under public than private conditions (Arkin et 
al., 1979; F e d e r o f f  & Har v e y ,  1976).
As discussed above, Duval and Wicklund disagree with 
Hull and Levy about the nature and operation of the effects 
of focussed self-awareness. Duval and Wicklund (1981) 
suggest that objective self-awareness generates 
self-evaluation that is motivated to evaluate self in regard 
to the id e a l  self and r e s u l t s  in a m o t i v a t i o n  to p r e s e n t  self 
in the most positive light across situations. Hull and Levy
(1979) suggest that focussed self-awareness is simply an 
altered cognitive set where people organize and interpret 
information from the standpoint of its self-relevance and in 
the context of the occurrence of the behavior. Therefore, a 
public context should involve more impression management 
behaviors by a subject than a private context because the 
environmental constraints of ot h e r s ’ impressions are absent 
in private contexts.
If on the one hand, Duval and Wicklund's explanations of 
objective self-awareness are accurate, self-enhancing
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attributions under objective self-awareness/anonymous 
conditions should be nearly equal to that of public 
conditions, for people should be concerned with self-ideal 
discrepancies equally under anonymous or public conditions.
On the other hand, if Levy and Hull's explanations are more 
adequate, people ought to engage in self-enhancing 
attributions to a lesser degree in anonymous (private) versus 
public conditions, approaching if not equaling subjective 
self-awareness/anonymous conditions. Furthermore, an 
examination of subjects' SDQ and ODQ scores should be very 
interesting, for such an exami nation may show that 
attributions made in a state of objective self-awareness are 
associated more strongly with impression management, 
self-deception, or some combination of the two.
Self-awareness has been induced by the presence of 
mirrors (Wicklund & Duval, 1972), tape recordings (Sackheim 
& Gur, 1978), and video recording cameras (Federoff & Harvey,
1976). It was decided to use mirrors in the present study 
because of their ease in fitting into the experimental 
situation without modification of the experimental setting 
and their ability to induce self-focus without sacrificing 
subjects' perceived anonymity.
CHAPTER 2
Rationale for Present Study
Attribution for Performance Outcomes
Since one's ideas include what "ought to be" and "what 
one would like to be" as well as "what is," attributions 
and cognitions are influenced by the more subjective 
f o r c e s  of ne e d s  and w i s h e s  as w e l l  as by the m o r e  
objective evidence presented in the raw material 
(Heider, 1958, pp. 120-121).
One is inclined to attribute to oneself good things, 
but one s u f f e r s  w h e n  one has to a t t r i b u t e  to o n e s e l f  
something that is not so good (Heider, 1976, p. 16).
The central focus of attribution theory in general is
the search to identify rules which individuals use to
infer causes of events that they observe around them.
Attribution theory arose from the study of person perception,
particularly from the work of Fritz Heider. Heider's theory
was concerned with the relationship between phenomenal
c ausality— the underlying or antecedant conditions that give
rise to a perceptual experience, and the perception of social
objects and events. In Heider's thinking, a social
occurrence (object of event) will not be perceived by an
observer in factual or objective fashion but will be
interpreted in consonance with the observers' past
experiences and present needs.
These perceptual processes, Heider speculated, serve two
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functions: (1) to form a coherent understanding of the events 
around us, and (2) to predict and control events through this 
understanding. In the process of explaining events which are 
witnessed, the naive observer constructs and uses his/her own 
individual predictive theory of human behavior. Such "naive 
psychology" permits the formation of judgments about the 
extent to which the behavior of the observed individual is 
being guided by internal dispositonal factors, external 
situational factors or a combination of both. Furthermore, 
according to Heider, an individual's selection of a causal 
attribution will be guided by his/her own needs and 
expectations as a person. The operation of a self-serving 
motive in attribution processes can be seen as a logical 
result of a preference to explain our behavior in the best 
possible light, given our need to maintain self-esteem and 
control over our environment.
A substantial number of research studies have 
investigated the interdependence of cognition and motivation. 
This research has demonstrated a tendency for individuals to 
make self-attributions for own positive behavioral outcomes 
and external attributions for own negative behavioral 
outcomes (e.g., Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Arkin, 
Gleason, & Johnston, 1976; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Forsyth & 
Schlenker, 1977; Weary, 1980; etc.).
As research has proliferated, differing viewpoints 
regarding the process have arisen. One viewpoint (Miller &
Ross, 1975) stresses a n o n m o t i v a t i o n a l , information 
processing attributional analysis. Their approach suggests 
that divergent attributions following success and failure 
outcomes stem from the attributer's initial mistaken 
conceptions regarding the nature of contingency. It is 
argued that one expects that persons generally intend to 
succeed when they attempt a task. A successful outcome 
therefore suggests a high degree of personal effectiveness 
and results in an internal attribution of causation. On the 
other hand, the same assumption regarding expected success 
leads to external attribution for failure outcomes. If an 
individual intends to succeed, but fails, the inference is 
drawn that the outcome has been caused by some outside 
influence. Thus, a logical error in information processing 
is in fact at the base of the self-enhancing attribution.
An opposing viewpoint advocated by Weary 
( B r a d l e y ’s married name) and others (Forsyth & Schlenker, 1977 
Rose, 1966; Schlenker, 1975; Weary, 1978; 1980) considers the 
attribution process to be motivationally determined.
According to this model, attributions for performance serve 
to protect and/or enhance self-esteem for the attributer and 
thus are subject to motivational biases rather than strict 
rational determination. Research findings in this area have 
found that self-enhancing attributions are made by subjects 
regardless of expectation about their own likelihood of 
success or failure on a task (Arkin, et al., 1976; Federoff &
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Harvey, 1976; Sicoly & Ross, 1977; Weary, 1980). Thus it 
seems as though Weary*s model of self-enhancing attributions 
\ s  the more accurate in conceptualizing this phenomenon.
Theorists who subscribe to the motivational view of 
causal attribution are divided in making explanations of the 
self-enhancement phenomenon. One camp can be said to ascribe 
to the theory of the "self-esteem motive" (Rosenberg, 1979; 
Sherwood, 1967). Jones and others (Gergen, 1971; Jones,
1973) hypothesized that self-enhancement behaviors maintain 
or increase self- esteem by providing an exemplary image of 
self to one's, self. Such behaviors may be useful in 
protecting the self from unpleasant self truths. In this 
view, high self-esteem is intrinsically rewarding to the 
self.
A second camp of theorists might be labeled 
"self-presentation" theorists (Weary & Arkin, 1980). In this 
conceptualization, self-enhancement is viewed as an 
impression m a n agement behavior designed to gain social 
approval or avoid social disapproval (Rose, 1966; Schlenker, 
1975; 1980; Weary, 1979; 1980). Self-enhancement then is 
viewed as a type of public presentation (Goffman, 1959).
Recent research has tended to support the view that 
self-enhancement is a behavior designed to manage a public 
presentation of self (Arkin, et al., 1980; Reiss, Rosenfeld, 
Melberg, & Tedeschi 1979; Weary, Harvey, Perloff, Schweiger,
& Olson, 1979). If self-presentation theory accounts for
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self-enhancement phenomena, then it would follow that 
self-enhancement should be associated with the need to show 
public impression management. A positive relationship should 
be shown between tendency to self-enhance and tendency to 
present oneself in a positive light to others. On the other 
hand, if the self-esteem motive theorists are correct, a 
relationship should be found between self-enhancing behavior 
and tendency to defend self from certain unpleasant truths 
about self, i.e, self-deceive, independent from awar eness of 
audience presence. In the latter case, the presence or 
absence of audience ought to have little or no effect. It 
could of course be that self-enhancing behaviors result from 
a function of both motives. In this circumstance, a more 
complicated relationship should result.
Social Comparison T h e o r y : C o d o l ’s Superior Conformity 
of Self Theory
Concurrent with the research in self-enhancing 
attribution in the U. S., Codol in France was conducting 
somewhat parallel research in the area of social comparison 
theory (Codol, 1975). The subject of his study was 
designated by Codol as the superior conformity of self 
phenomenon (abbreviated by Codol as PIP, from primus inter 
pares, first among equals). Superior conformity of self, 
according to Codol, is the tendency for an individual to 
assert that he/she conforms more closely to the set of norms 
prevailing in a given situation than do other participants in
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the same reference group. In other words, Codol reported a 
type of social comparison phenomenon which seems similar 
to certain aspects of self-enhancing attribution research.
Through an extensive series of studies, Codol was able 
to establish the conditions under which such claiming of self 
superiority could be demonstrated. Similar to conditions 
needed to produce self-enhancing attributions, Codol found 
that tendency to present self as superior could be increased 
by raising concerns for self-esteem. Codol found that by 
increasing importance of norm or reference group for 
individual, by producing ambiguity in the comparison group 
(by using generalized rather than specific other for 
comparison standard), by using more subjective rather than 
objective measures of attributes, and by varying the amount 
of familiarity between actor and observer in. the experiment 
tendencies to increase superior self comparisons increased 
(Codol, 1975).
Codol made some interesting speculations about the need 
for individuals to make superior conformity of self 
comparisons in order both to conform to the requirements of a 
reference group and yet to maintain a separate identity. 
Furthermore, and more importantly to the topic at hand, Codol 
suggested that superior conformity of self behaviors are 
related to need for social approval, i.e., the more important 
it is to be s o c i a l l y  a c c e p t e d  in s o m e  s i t u a t i o n ,  the m o r e  
likely the individual is to claim superior self comparisons
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in that situation, given certain conditions. Moreover, Codol 
reported findings that suggest that need for social approval 
covaries positively with tendency to engage in superior self 
c o m p a r i s o n s .
Codol did not discuss in his work whether superior self 
comparisons could be expected to vary with audience 
conditions. He gave no indication whether self comparisons 
could be expected to be equal or to vary in some way across 
private versus public conditions.
If, as it appears, self-enhancing attributions and 
superior conformity of self comparisons are parallel features 
of the same phenomenon, i.e., desire to appear good to self 
and/or others, then it can be predicted that a strong 
positive correlation should be seen between such behaviors. 
Secondly, as in the case of self-enhancing phenomena, if 
superior conformity of self is a behavior designed for 
self-presentation motives, then it would follow that superior 
self comparisons should be positively correlated with need to 
manage public impressions. On the other hand, if superior 
self comparisions are behaviors engaged in to increase 
self-esteem without consideration of audience demands, then 
there should be little relationship between self comparison 
behaviors and presence or absence of audience. Finally, if 
the latter case is true, then it seems likely that a strong 
positive correlation should exist between tendency to engage 
in superior self comparions and tendency to self-deceive in
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order to improve self-esteem.
Audience Conditions
Review of the self-enhancing attribution literature 
indicates that subjects' awareness of audience has been 
manipulated in a number of ways. Early studies included an 
observer subject who watched as subjects performed a task 
(Beckman, 1970). Groups of subjects have been used as 
observers of their own and other group members' performance 
(Wortman, Consfanzo, & Witt, 1973; Wolosin, Sherman, & Till, 
1973). Research has shown that varying levels of objective 
self-awareness can affect the manner in which self-enhancing 
attribution are made (Bergen & Rodman, 1983; Hull & Levy,
197 9; Reiss, Rosenfeld, Mel berg, & Tedeschi, 1979). Several 
studies have provided anonymous conditions, wherein the 
subjects could be assured of anonymous participation in the 
study (Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Weary, 1980; Weary, 
Harvey, Schweiger, & Olson, 1979). Weary-Bradley (1979) 
emphasized the importance of making certain that the 
experimenter is not viewed by subjects as a possible observer 
of behavior in anonymous conditions, for this may have the 
s a m e  e f f e c t  on s u b j e c t s  as p l a c i n g  t h e m  b e f o r e  a gr o u p  or 
designated observer. Great care must be taken to insure the 
subjects anonymity in a manner that they can confirm for 
the m s e l v e s .
Given the findings in the research on audience 
conditions as cited above, the following four
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audience conditions were chosen: (1) anonymous, (2) anonymous
with induced self-awareness through the presence of mirrors, 
(3) subjects as direct observers of their own and others' 
performance in a public format, (4) subjects as in condition 
three but with the addition of a formal observer. The last 
condition was designed to examine whether an official 
observer of performance would have any additional effect on 
attributions and self comparisons that mere observing by 
other mem b e r s  of the group would not. This condition was put 
in place to try to determine "experimenter" effects, i.e., to 
try to identify any effect that might be experienced by 
s u b j e c t s  who k n o w  that in a d d i t i o n  to their peers, they are 
also being observed by the experimenter. In other words, can 
an additional or increased audience effect be demonstrated if 
one's behavior is being observed not only by peers but by 
"experts" who are specifically watching subjects' ability to 
perform a task?
Goals of the Present Study
The present research had six purposes: (1) to examine
effect of the type of audience (no audience-anonymous, self 
as audience, other subjects as audience, other subjects plus 
offical observer as audience) on the attribution of 
success and failure; (2) to determine the effects of type 
of audience on self-other comparison (no audience-anonymous, 
self as audience, other subjects as audience, other subjects 
plus official observer as audience); (3) to determine the
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effect of negative feedback on tendency to engage in superior 
self comparions; (4) to determine the relationship between 
tendency to engage in self-enhancing behaviors and tendency 
to make superior self comparisons; (5) to determine the 
relationship between self-enhancing behaviors and need to 
manage audience impressions and/or self-deceive to maintain 
self-esteem; (6) to determine the relationship between 
tendency to make superior self comparisons and need to manage 
audience impression and/or self-deceive to maintain 
sel f - e s t e e m .
After reviewing the literature of both attribution and 
social comparison research, it seemed that the dot judging 
task d e v e l o p e d  by F i t c h  (1970) w o u l d  w o r k  w e l l  for a 
performance task as it provided a task where success or 
failure feedback could easily be given. Dot judging also 
appeared to meet the qualifications for absence of prior 
experience and therefore it was possible to easily control 
subjects’ expectation of the difficulty of the task. In 
order to assure self-esteem involvment, subjects were 
informed that performance on this task reflected a measure of 
nonverbal intelligence. It was assumed that this would 
involve subjects' self-esteem as intelligence is considered 
highly valued in our culture. Performance on the task seemed 
to lend itself to attributional explanations and task 
structure appeared to invite comparisons on performance.
As discussed above, levels of audience
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conditions were selected. It was decided to induce 
self-awareness by use of mirrors, a methodology developed by 
Wicklund and Duval (1972). Other audience conditions 
included in the study were anonymous (no audience), 
public (subjects could see each other), and public observer 
(subjects could see both each other and an an official 
observer watching them).
Attribution were measured in a way similar to that used 
by Elig and Frieze (1979). Separate measures of internal and 
external attributions were combined into a single index.
Self-other comparison measures were developed based on 
Codol's described model (1975).
Paulhus (1984) presented psychometric data concerning 
measures of social desirability. He concluded that Gur and 
Sackheim's measures (1979; Self-Deception Questionnaire, SDQ; 
Other— Deception Questionnaire, ODQ) showed the best ability 
to discriminate need to self-deceive and need to manage 
public impression of self. These measures were completed by 
subjects in the present study.
CHAPTER THREE
Method
Participants
Subjects were 96 male and 96 female introductory 
psychology students who participated in order to earn 
research credit toward a class requirement. Subjects were 
run in groups. Each person was randomly assigned to one of 
eight possible conditions. A confederate participated in 
each group. There were five participants per group and six 
groups per condition. Subjects were run in same sex groups 
to eliminate possible gender pressure effects.
Procedure
The subjects and confederate were greeted by an 
experimental assistant in a waiting room and escorted 
individually to seats in a laboratory room. The confederate 
was instructed to appear in the waiting room approximately 
five minutes prior to the beginning of the experiment to 
avoid possible suspiciousness by subjects. In anonymous 
conditions, subjects were seated in partitioned booths facing 
forward with front openings for viewing. Such booths insured 
anonymity of subjects. In public conditions, subjects were 
seated in the open room behind a barrier; they
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w e r e  a b l e  to see each o t h e r  and the e x p e r i m e n t e r ,  but the 
experimenter was not be able to see them. Each subject 
received an identifying experimental number corresponding to 
his/her seat position with which she/he was to identify all 
written materials. Subjects were assured by the experimental 
assistant that this number and seating position had been 
r a n d o m l y  a s s i g n e d  to t h e m  and w a s  only to be used for the 
purpose of keeping all experimental materials for each 
subject together. Confederates' answer cards were marked to 
clearly identify them to the experimenter only.
When all subjects were seated, the experimenter entered 
and moved to the back of the room. She thanked the 
participants for coming. The experimenter then explained 
that the experiment was designed to investigate a perceptual 
acuity task which has been found useful in predicting 
intelligence with nonverbal tasks from the Leiter 
International Performance Scale. She further explained that 
thi s task had been s h o w n  to be a f f e c t e d  by g r o u p  f o r m a t  
administration and that it would be this aspect which was to 
be investigated in this study. In order to create a 
normative expectation of accuracy and to m a ximize 
consideration of s u b j e c t s ’ self-esteem in doing the task, the 
subjects were told that this test has been validated several 
times by psychologists and used in the past with nonverbal 
populations as part of an intelligence assessment instrument. 
Furthermore, they were told that it was a very accurate and
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reliable measure of perceptual acuity and gave a good measure 
on nonverbal intelligence when administered individually. 
Moreover, they were told that it had been found that accuracy 
on this test increases with social facilitation effects, so 
that ordinary performance had been seen to improve when 
performance had taken place in groups. Subjects were told to 
expect feedback about their performance following the 
testing. No information was given at this time regarding 
test score norms. (See Appendix A for task instructions.)
Nex t it wa s  e x p l a i n e d  to the s u b j e c t s  that they were.to 
examine a series of slides and make judgments about those 
slides. E a c h  sl i d e  w o u l d  s h o w  a s q u a r e  w i t h  a n u m b e r  of dot s 
scattered randomly over it. The subjects were told that they 
w e r e  to judge the n u m b e r  of do t s  on the s l i d e s  (dot d e n s i t y  
es timation task). Subjects were asked to look at the slide 
for three seconds and make their most accurate estimate as to 
the number of dots contained in the square. After the 
estimate was made and written on an identity coded slip, the 
subjects were instructed to place the slip in a pocket beside 
his or her seat w h e r e  it c o u l d  be c o l l e c t e d  by the 
experimenter (See Appendix B). The experimenter then 
collected these esti mates and recorded them on an overhead 
projector in an ordered fashion, so each individual knew 
which estimate had come from each seat position in both 
anonymous and public conditions. Those subjects in the 
anonymous conditions did not know the identity of any
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individual who made a judgment, only that the judgment was 
made by a person in a particular seat position. Subjects in 
public conditions were able to identify the estimates of each 
group member as well as the individual making the estimate.
Subjects repeated the judging sequence for the two other 
practice slides. At the end of each judging trial the 
experimenter posted the actual number of dots in the square 
for all to see. Three practice squares and six actual test 
slides were presented. During the practice squares, an 
effort was made to create ambiguity for the subjects 
regarding expectations of succeeding or failing on the task 
by presenting three levels of difficulty of slides, easy, 
difficult and moderate. Confederates' score cards were 
actually blank and the experimenter recorded their score as 
either the same as the most accurate subject estimate or two 
dots closer to the correct answer. This determination was 
made by random assignment prior to the beginning of the 
experimental session. Subjects were asked to rate their 
expectation of success following the three practice trials to 
provide a check on subjects' expectancy of success. (See 
Ap p e n d i x  C.)
Next, the six test trials were conducted. At the end of 
six trials, subjects were told that the answers would be 
scored by assistants in another room. While the scores 
purportedly were being calculated, subjects were asked to 
fill out the Self-Deception Questionnaire (SDQ) and Other-
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Deception Questionnaire (ODQ). Subjects were told that this 
task was part of a different study by another graduate 
student who had asked to have subjects fill them out during 
their waiting period to save time in collecting data.
After approximately 10 minutes, the assistant brought in 
the test results. The experimenter had no' knowledge of the 
participants' success or failure feedback. Before the 
envelopes were passed to subjects, the experimenter explained 
that a s c o r e  b e t w e e n  100 and 200 w a s  p o s s i b l e  on the test and 
that persons of average perceptual skill score approx imately 
150 points. A bell curve was drawn showing where possible 
test results might fall. All participants in each group 
received feedback indicating their score fell either very 
much above the average or very much below. (See Appendix F 
for feedback form.)
Following feedback, a questionnaire measuring all 
dependent variables was handed out to subjects. After these 
were completed and collected, the manipulation check 
questionnaire was handed out. Subjects were told that this 
questionnaire was designed to get their impressions about the 
test and that such information was considered in further 
administration of the study. (See Appendix G for dependent 
variable questionnaire, H for manipulation check.)
After the manipulation check was completed, subjects 
were informed of the real purpose of the experiment and the 
importance of deception in the experiment was explained to
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them. Subjects were asked to maintain secrecy regarding the 
purpose of the study. (See Appendix I for debriefing 
instructions . )
Independent Variables
The design was a two (Success/Failure) by four (Levels 
of Audience Awareness) factorial, resulting in eight 
conditions. All subjects across conditions received the same 
instruction concerning the dot estimation task. Four levels 
of audience awareness were created by manipulation of the 
physical setting. In the anonymous only condition, each 
subject was seated individually in an enclosed cubicle. In 
the anonymous self-aware condition, seating was similar to 
the anonymous condition, but a hand held mirror reflected the 
subject's image during the experiment. In the public only 
condition, the subjects were able to see each other during 
the experiment, but were separated from the experimenter by a 
barrier so the subjects could not be seen by the 
experimenter. In the public-observer condition, the subjects 
w e r e  able to see e a c h  o t h e r  and a p e r s o n  w h o  w a s  a s s i g n e d  as 
an observer, but were again separated from the experimenter 
by a barrier. The observer carried a clipboard and affected 
a professional appearance.
Subjects received individual copies of their bogus test 
score results. They were told that their scores fell either 
into the upper fifth of percentile scores (83rd percentile)
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or the lower third of scores (23rd percentile) for the 
ability being measured, based on norms for past group 
performances. (See Appendix F for feedback form.)
Dependent Measures
Self-enhancing attributions can be manifested in 
numerous ways that may be used more or less interchangeably, 
for example, by taking or denying personal responsibility, by 
blaming other group me m b e r s  and by blaming environmental 
factors (Mynatt & Sherman, 1975; Schlenker, 1975). To 
provide an adequate measure assessing such variables, several 
measures were used: Subjects were asked to rate the 
extent to which each of four factors (a) ability, (b) effort, 
(c) difficult of task and (d) luck play in the outcome of the 
individual’s performance on a -3 to +3 scale with endpoints 
anchored with the words strongly a g r e e , strongly disagree.
An index of internal-external locus of attribution was 
computed by subtracting sum of attributions made to the 
external factors, i.e., task difficulty and luck, from the 
sum of attribution made to internal factors. Thus, more 
positive values corresponded to more internal attributions 
whereas more negative values indicated more external 
attribtuions. This independent scales method has been 
suggested by Elig and Frieze (1979) as the technique of 
choice, at least for college students making causal 
attributions for tasks.
In order to measure superior conformity of self
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comparsions, several index measures were constructed. First, 
a m e a s u r e  of a c t u a l  a c c u r a c y  on the ta s k  w a s  n e e d e d  (Rank 
o r d e r e d  f r o m  1 to 5, w i t h  1 be i n g  m o s t  a c c u r a t e  on each 
trial. Ties, i.e., when two subjects performed equally well, 
were assigned half integer scores, e.g., if both subjects 
actually scored a 2 in accuracy, both received scores of 2.5. 
This could be obtained from the actual accuracy scores earned 
by subjects. These scores were collected and a mean accuracy 
rating over trials was compiled for each subject. Next 
subjects were asked to rank order each of the mem bers of 
their group for accuracy from the most accurate to the least, 
using the subjects seating position to identify subjects (a 
rank of 1 was most accurate, 5 least). This yielded a 
perceived self accuracy rating. The difference between 
perceived accuracy ranking and actual accuracy rating was 
calculated for each subject. This gave an index of what can 
be called the PIP difference, ranging from -4 to +4 (Positive 
numbers indicated presence of PIP effect, that is, a tendency 
to rate oneself better than on e ’s actual performance). An 
index of "confederate devaluation" was calculated by 
subtracting the subjects' ratings of the confederate from 
their self rating. This index was included as Codol reported 
that many of his subjects devalued the confederates ranking 
even though the confederate was the most accurate throughout 
trials. The subjects were asked to rate their ability on 
this task compared to the "average group member", the
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"average college student" and the "average person in the 
population" on a 9-point Likert-scale ranging from much less 
ability to much more ability on this task and with anchor 
points at -2 and +2. (See Appendix G.)
The ODQ and SDQ were in 7-item Likert- format with 20 
items each. A score for each person was obtained for each 
scale. (See A p p e n d i x e s  D and E.)
A manipulation check included questions about the nature 
of task, understanding of the origination of the task, 
purpose for including group format, etc. (See Appendix H for 
the manipulation check questionnaire.
CHAPTER FOUR
Results
Expectancy Checks
To assess level of expectation of success on 
the dot judging tasks, subjects were asked to rate on 9-point 
Likert-type scales (-4--very difficult to +4--very easy) how 
d i f f i c u l t  e a c h  of the s a m p l e  i t e m s  w a s  found to be, ho w  
difficult the dot judging sample tasks were found to be 
overall, and how well they expected to do on the actual task. 
The results indicate that subjects found a significant 
difference in difficulty between the first, second, and third 
sample judging tasks in a one (Judging Difficulty) by three 
(Sample 1, Sample 2, Sample 3) split plot analysis of 
v a r i a n c e  (ANOVA), F(2,352) = 4.28, =.01. P a i r w i s e
comparison of means using the Neum an-Keuls procedures showed 
Sample 1 (M = .29) and Sample 3 (_M = 1.02) means differing 
significantly from one another, as do the Sample 1 and Sample 
2 (M = .82) me a n s ,  £  = .01, s u g g e s t i n g  a p o s s i b l e  
practice effect over trials.
As desired, there were no significant differences found 
between groups in the dependent variable of rated overall 
difficulty of dot judging when examined in a
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two (Male/Female) by two (Success/Failure) by four (Public, 
Public-Observer, Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA. As a group,
subjects appeared to have no clear expectation of difficulty 
or ease of the judging task, with the general £  statistic 
based on pooled estimate of error, £(184) = 1.05, £  ^  .30,
indicating expectations did not deviate significantly from 
the midpoint of the scale, i.e., zero (Edwards, 1985). This 
was further confirmed in examination of the 16 cell means, 
none of which significantly differed from zero (Dunnett’s 
test for comparison with a control of standard value, 1955).
Finally, a significant two way interaction of sex and 
audience condition was noted for the dependent varialbe of 
predicted future difficulty of dot judging in a two 
(Male/Female) by two (Success/Failure) by four (Public, 
Public-Observer, Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA, F(3, 175) = 
2.62, £  = .05. Pairwise comparison using the Neu man-Keuls 
procedure yielded no significant differences between means,
£  > .05. When examined as one group, subjects appeared to 
have expectations of success on the task £(191) = 5.58, £  
<.0001 (general £  statistic based on pooled estimate of 
error, Edwards, 1985). However, an examination of cell means 
showed no group to have significant expectations above that 
of a particular other group regarding future success or 
failure on the dot judging task (See Table 1; Dunnett's test 
for comparison with a control of standard value, 1955).
It should be noted here that when subjects were dropped
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from the analysis as a result of manipulation check 
difficulties (see below), all significant findings on 
expectancy checks disappeared.
Manipulation Checks
Checks on the independent variable manipulations were 
conducted by asking subjects to indicate whether they had 
been observed during the task, where they perceived their 
task judging score being in relationship to the norms given 
by the experimenter, and their perception of the purposes of 
the j u d g i n g  ta s k  and g r o u p  s i t u a t i o n  in t e r m s  of n e e d s  for 
accuracy. Checks on manipulation indicate that 92 subjects 
(47%) incorrectly identified their audience condition. Four 
subjects (2%) incorrectly identified their feedback scores on 
the dot estimation task. Fourty-seven individuals (24%) were 
unable to correctly identify reasons given by the 
experimenter for providing a group format in administration. 
No subjects were removed from the sample due to 
suspiciousness regarding the experimental hypotheses. 
Fifty-eight subjects (30%) failed to see the task as a valid 
measure of intelligence. T w e n t y - t w o  subjects (11%) 
apparently disagreed that accuracy was an important factor in 
succeeding at the task.
Because of the large number of subjects who may have 
perceived their assigned audience conditions inaccurately or 
failed to attend to the instructions, all statistical 
analyses were conducted twice, once with all subjects
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included and once with the 92 incorrectly reporting subjects 
dropped from analyses. With the exception.of two analyses 
cited below, the two sets of analyses yielded similar 
significant findings.
Deriving and Calculating S u b j e c t s 1 Scores
The attributions of subjects for the task performance on 
the judging task included responses on four specific 
dimensions: ability, effort, task difficulty and luck. Each 
subject's responses on the first two were su m m e d  to provide a 
measure to internal factors; reponses to the last two were 
summed to produce a measure of attribution to external 
factors, The external sum score was subtracted from the 
internal sum score to reveal an index of internal/external 
attributions (ATTRIB score). A more positive score indicated 
internal attributions, a more negative score indicated 
external attributions.
Self comparison index scores were calculated by rank 
ordering subjects within group for accuracy on each trial, 
averaging the rankings over trials for every subject and then 
subtracting the subjects' actual accuracy (SLFACC) ranking 
from that s/he assigned to hira/herself when asked to rank the 
m e m b e r s  of his group (PIP score, -3 to +4). More positive 
scores indicated that the subject engaged in superior self 
comparisons, more negative scores indicated that he/she did 
not. Subjects' ranking of the confederate was subtracted 
from self-ranking score, to obtain a confederate devaluation
score. Subjects were also asked to rate themselves compared 
to other m e m b e r s  of his group (AVEGROUP score), other college 
students (AVECOLLG score), and general others (AVEPERS score) 
on 7-point Likert-type scales, wherein a negative score 
indicated less ability and a positive score indicated more 
ability. Three indices were then calculated for subjects in 
the following manner: Subjects' SLFACC score was converted
to a -2 to +2 s c a l e  by s u b t r a c t i n g  3 f r o m  the sc o r e  and 
multiplying by -1. After this was done, subjects' scores 
were obtained by subtracting the converted SLFACC score from 
AVEGROUP, AVECOLLG, and AVEPERS to yield indices of superior 
self comparisons across these variables, now identified as 
PIPGROUP, P I P C O L L G , and PIPPERS.
The Self Deception Questionnaire is a 20-item instrument 
in the 7-point Likert-scale format. A 1 or 2 response 
circled on an item is considered a self-deceiving response 
(scores as 1 point in the direction of self-deception; 
Sackheim & Gur, 1979). Subject's individual item scoring was 
tallied and an overall score was designated for each 
i n d i v i d u a l .
Similarly, the Other Deception Questionnaire is a 
20-item Likert-type scale and it is scored in a manner 
similar to the above.
Analysis of Variance on the Variable of ATTRIB
A two (Male/Female) by two (Success/Failure) by four 
(Public, Publ i c - O b s e r v e r , Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA was
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carried out on the dependent variable of ATTRIB. No 
significant differences were found. In examining the mean 
for the entire sample for ATTRIB, it appeared that there was a 
significant tendency for subjects to make internal 
attributions for their results, Jt(191) = A.19, j> < .01 
(General _t statistic based on pooled estimate of error, 
Edwards, 1985). However, in examining individual cell means, 
such a tendency did not appear signficant for any cell, 
j) > .05 (See Table 2; Dunnett's test for comparison with a 
control of standard value, 1955).
Analysis of Variance of Measures of Superior Conformity of 
Self
Because only three of the subjects devalued the 
confederate's score (found the confederate to rank below 
themselves in performance), this index was dropped from the 
a n a l y s e s .
A split-plot analysis of variance conducted to examine 
differences between means on variables of PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, 
and PIPPERS showed that scores increased as comparison groups 
b e c a m e  m o r e  g e n e r a l  in n a t u r e  (M = .354; M = .567; M = .875), 
F(l,352) = 37.03, £  = .0001, i n d i c a t i n g  g r e a t e r  PIP. The 
dependent variable PIP could not be included in this analysis 
as it was computed on a different range of values.
Total sample means for PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG and 
PIPPERS were examined and found to show significant superior 
self comparision effects with the exception of PIP and
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P I P G R O U P  (t(191) = .24, £  > .05, t (1 9 1) = 1.34, £  > .05, 
£(191) = 2.15, £  = .05, £(191) = 3.26, £  = .01, r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  
General £  statistic based on pooled estimate of error; 
Edwards, 1985).
Although analysis of variance showed significant 
differences between groups, and although trends in the 
direction of expectation were seen, pairwise comparisons of 
PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG and PIPPER using Neuman-Keuls procedures 
yielded no significant differences between means, £  > .05. No 
significant differences were found across audience conditions 
(Public, P u b l i c - O b s e r v e r , Anonymous, Self-Aware), £  = .13. 
Analysis of Variance on Self-Deception and Other-Deception 
Questionnaires
S c o r e s  on the SDQ and 0DQ w e r e  e x a m i n e d  in s e p a r a t e  t w o  
(Male/Female) by four (Public, Public-Observer, Anonymous, 
Self-Aware) ANOVAs, looking at the effects of sex and 
audience condition. Main effects for sex were found to be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  in bo t h  cases: SDQ, F(l, 183) = 4.15, £  = .04, 
and 0DQ, F(l, 183) *» 6.77, £  = .01. F e m a l e s  s c o r e d  s c o r e d  
consistently higher than males across conditions (See Table 
3) indicating more self and other deception for females.
Because of the gender differences discovered in this 
analysis, it was determined that further analyses should be 
conducted using median splits based on high and low scores on 
the SDQ and 0DQ. Such analyses follow below.
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Analysis of Variance by Median Split on the Variable of 
Self-Deception
A median split was performed on the Self-Deception 
scores, such that median scores for males and females were 
established separately, and high scorers of both sexes placed 
in one category and low scorers in the other. The median 
split procedure resulted in a two (High/Low Self-Deception 
Score) by two (Male/Female) by two (Success/Failure) by four 
(Public, P u b lic-Observer, Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA across 
dependent variables of ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, AND 
PIPPERS.
Analysis of variance of the variable ATTRIB 
No significant differences were found on the dependent 
variable ATTRIB.
Analysis of variance on the variable PIP 
A significant main effect was found for feedback 
(Success/Failure), F(l,142) = 13.87, £  = .0001. Pairwise 
comparisons using the Neuman-Keuls procedure showed 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  (M * .49, M = -.26), £  < .01.
Analysis of variance on the variable PIPGROUP 
A significant two way interaction (Success/Failure 
Feedback) by (High/Low SDQ) was found, F(l, 141) = 6.51, £
= .01. Pairwise comparison using the Neuman-Keuls procedure 
failed to show significance, £  > .05.
No other significant results were found in the median 
split analysis on variables PIPCOLLG or PIPPERS.
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Analysis of Variance by Median Split on the Variable of
Other-Deception
A median split was performed on the Other-Deception 
Scale scores, such that median scores for males and females 
were established separately, and high scorers of both sexes 
placed in one category and low scores in the other. The
median split procedure resulted in a two (High/Low 
Other-Deception Score) by two (Male/Female) by two 
(Success/Failure) by four (Public, P u b l i c - Observer, 
Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA across dependent variables of 
ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, and PIPPERS.
Analysis of variance on variable ATTRIB 
No significant results were shown in this analysis. 
Analysis of Variance on Variable PIP 
A significant main effect was found for feedback 
(Success/Failure), F(l,141) = 18.74, 2. ~ -001. Pairwise 
comparisons using the Neuman-Keuls procedure failed to show 
s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  2. > .05.
No other significant results were found on variables 
PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG or PIPPERS.
Correlational Analyses
Attribution and self comparison measures 
The relationship between tendency to make self-serving 
attributions (ATTRIB) and tendency to make superior self 
compa risons (PIP, P I P G R O U P , PIPCOLLG, PIPPERS) was examined 
using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (jr)
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for ea c h  of the 16 c e l l s  f o r m e d  by a t w o  ( M a l e / F e m a l e )  by two 
(Success/Failure) by four (Public, Public-O b s e r v e r ,
Anonymous, Self-Aware) design. The pattern of correlations 
and their significance levels are presented in Table A. 
Fifty-seven of 112 correlations reached levels that were 
significant (six expected by chance alone). There appeared 
to be no clearly distinguishable pattern present, between 
variables of ATTRIB and variables of superior self 
conparison. However, while not always statistically 
significant, there appears to be a negative relationship 
between the PIP variable and other varibles measuring 
superior self comparison in more general comparison groups 
(PIPGRP, PIPCOLLG, PIPPERS). Moreover, variables based on 
generalized group compa risons (PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, and 
PIPPERS) generally showed high correlation with one another. 
Self-deception and other-deception measures 
S c o r e s  on the SDQ and OD Q  w e r e  e x a m i n e d  u s i n g  the 
correlation coefficient (jr) to determine the degree of 
possible relationship between them, jr(189) = .26, £
- .001.
Self-deception and variables ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, 
PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS
The relationships between scores on the SDQ and 
variables ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, and PIPPERS were 
examined across the four audience conditions (Public, 
Public-Observer, Anonymous, Self-Aware) using the Pearson
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correlation coefficient (rj to determine the possible degree 
of relationship (See Table 5). When the 92 subjects who 
failed to complete condition checks correctly were dropped 
from the sample, size and significance of correlations 
increased (See Table 6).
Other-deception and variables ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, 
PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS
The relationships between scores on the ODQ and 
variables ATTRIB, PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, and PIPPERS were 
also examined using the Pearsonian correlation coefficient 
(£) to determine the possible degree of relationship (See 
Table 7). As above, dropping the 92 subjects changed results 
rather markedly (See Table 8), both increasing size and 
significance of correlation coefficients and changing the 
pattern of correlations.
CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion
The r e s u l t s  of the p r e s e n t  st u d y  are in s o m e  w a y s  
perplexing. Information resulting from statistical analyses 
of expectancy and manipulation checks suggests on the one 
hand that when all subjects are included, there exists a sex 
by conditions interaction effect on expectancy of task 
difficulty, despite efforts to hold expectancy constant 
across conditions and at a level where subjects would be 
uncertain as to what difficulty level to expect. On the 
other hand, when 92 subjects were dropped from the study 
because of their reported incorrect perceptions of the 
audience conditions, all significant effects on variables of 
expectancy disappear while the rema ining analyses for the 
most part do not change markedly. It seems possible to 
conclude as have others (Arkin, et al., 1976; Federoff & 
Harvey, 1976; Sicoly & Ross, 1977; Weary, 1980) that 
sub j e c t s ’ expectations about task difficulty do not radically 
affect attribution and self comparison variables, but this 
conclusion cannot be offered with certainty, given the 
unexpected nature of some further results in this study.
Unlike the many studies cited in the literature (Seej
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Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975; Schlenker, 1975), results) 
of the present study demonstrate no significant differences 
in making causal attributions for success and failure on 
tasks. Because no self-enhancing bias was shown, no 
conclusions could be drawn regarding motivational aspects of 
the phenomenon, i.e., do self-enhancing attributions serve 
self-esteem (Gergen, 1971; Jones, 1973; Rosenberg, 1979; 
Sherwood, 1967) or self-presentational motives (Rose, 1966; 
Schlenker, 1975, 1980; Weary & Arkin, 1980). Nor could a 
relationship be determined between self-enhancement and
superior self comparison. More research is needed to ^
1understand the relationship between these variables. ^
On the other hand, as predicted by Codol (1975), 
superior self comparisons were found in this study. Subjects 
showed a significant tendency to rate selves as superior to 
others and showed significant differences in rating 
themselves based on the ambiguity of the comparison group 
employed. While not significant, a trend was seen in that 
subjects increased the inflation of their self comparisons 
with the increased ambiguity (generality) of the comparison 
g r o u p .
No differences were found across audience conditions on 
any of the superior self comparison variables. This initial 
evidence appears to suggest that superior self comparisons 
may be in service of increasing self-esteem rather than 
managing audience impression since one might expect a change
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across conditions if the latter was true.
The findings regarding the relationship between superior 
self comparisons and social approval measures is difficult to 
interpret. Median split analysis based on SDQ and ODQ scores 
failed to show significant results (See below).
One of the puzzling findings of the present study 
concerns subjects' attributions of responsiblity for outcomes 
on the task. The fact that no differences in 
internal/ external attributions were found across conditions 
is surprising, given the many studies which have demonstrated 
the phenomenon (See reviews by Bradley, 1978; Miller and 
Ross, 1975). In view of the copious findings of 
self-enhancing attributions in the literature, it seems 
likely that such effects do exist. It therefore appears more 
helpful to look for possible circumstances which may have 
precluded establishing such effects in the present case. One 
possibility might be, of course, that this particular sample 
of subjects was in some way unusual in making attributions of 
responsiblity for success/failure. A second possibility 
/fcould be t h a t  cell s a m p l e  s i z e s  of 12 are s i m p l y  too s m a l l  to 
1 allow the small effects to be considered significant, 
although an examination of the results did not appear to 
d e m o nstrate clear trends in the expected directions. Another 
possibility to consider is that some aspect of the 
experimental situation prevented subjects from making more 
usual attributions. Perhaps the task, i.e., judging dots to
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determine nonverbal intelligence was simply not compelling or 
convincing enough to involve subjects' self esteem and 
participation. Perhaps for some reason performance feedback 
was not sufficiently convincing. Whatever the reason, lack 
of clear internal/external attributions makes the explanation 
of further experimental findings problematic.
In view of results examining self-enhancing 
attributions, it is encouraging that most measures of 
superior co nformity of self were shown to be significant at 
the .05 or .01 level. This suggests that superior conformity  
of self may be a fairly robust construct. Furthermore, 
although nonsignificant, the strong tendency for superior 
conformity of self measures to increase in size with 
increased generality of co mparison groups helps confirm 
Codol's f i n d i n g s  (1975).
An unexpected but interesting finding was that of the 
main effect for gemder on measures of both SDQ and ODQ. 
According to the analyses of results, females scored higher 
than males across conditions on both of these measures. 
Previous studies using these instruments have either failed 
to report gender effects (Sackheim & Gur, 1978; 1979) or have 
reported no differences for sex (Paulhus, 1984). Gender 
differences may suggest that females have higher needs to 
self-deceive and impression manage, may actually have 
different base rates of behaviors designated on the SDQ and 
ODQ as statistically infrequent, or may simpy respond in
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more socially "appropriate" ways for some reason, e.g., may 
be more socially "in tune" with expectations than their male 
counterparts. Attempted replication of the findings appears 
w o r t h w h i l e .
Although in some ways disappointing, the median split 
analyses resulted in some thought provoking findings. In 
looking at the median split results for SDQ and ODQ, a 
finding of a m a i n  e f f e c t  for f e e d b a c k  on the p r i m a r y  self 
comparison variable should not be surprising. After all, if 
one te l l s  a s u b j e c t  that s/he has done w e l l  or p o o r l y  at a 
task in comparison to others, it is not surprising that the 
subject rates him or herself as having performed much better 
or worse that those others. What is more surprising is that 
main effects disappeared as the comparison group became more 
general (i.e., PIPCOLLG, PIPPERS). Indirectly, this tends to 
support Codol's theory of superior self comparison in that 
subjects could move away from or in effect disguise or 
improve their performance by moving to a larger group for 
comparison. Thus the main effect for feedback disappears.
In examining the PIPGROUP variable (how do you rate 
yourself in relationship to the average group member), a 
significant interaction of feedback (Success/Failure) and 
level of SDQ (High/Low) was seen. Those showing low SDQ 
rated themselved higher than high SDQ subjects when subjects 
were given success feedback. This tendency reversed itself 
when subjects were given failure feedback. If such findings
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could be replicated, it would further suggest that those 
subjects low in need to self-deceive can actually report and 
perhaps perceive their performance more accurately than do 
th o s e  h i g h  on SDQ. If w o m e n  ten d to s c o r e  h i g h e r  than me n  on 
this factor, such findings may lead to some important 
revelations about perceptual differences between men and 
w o m e n .
It is seems clear that median split analyses did not 
lead to much helpful information regarding the relationships 
among variables in this study. This may be further explained 
by looking at the correlational analyses between variables 
(See below).
Contrary to early predictions, correlational analyses 
showed no clear pattern of correlations between attributions 
and superior self comparisons. Because of various factors, 
i.e., manipulation problems, failure to find attribution 
effects, etc., it cannot be concluded that no relationship 
exists, only that one was not found in this study. More 
investigation is needed to determine what the relationship 
might be between these two variables. An inverse 
relationship appears to exist between PIP and other measures 
of superior self comparison, indicating that the less one 
engaged in superor self comparison in an actual group, the 
more one tended to show in more general comparisons. It was 
also found that superior self comparisons correlated 
positively across the more general comparisons, indicating a
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consistent tendency on parts of subjects to engage in PIP. 
Examination of the correlational analyses on the SDQ and ODQ 
measures yields results that might help explain why median 
split analyses failed to find significant results. First, as 
expected, performance on SDQ and ODQ are somewhat but not 
h i g h l y  r e l a t e d  (jr = .26, js = .000). Such f i n d i n g s  m e r e l y  
confirm what has been found by other researchers (Paulhus, 
1984). Second, examination of correlational matrices for SDQ 
and ODQ and other dependent variables of interest suggests 
that SDQ is more highly correlated with variables PIP, 
PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG, and PIPPERS in Public-Observer and 
Anonymous audience conditions. The relationship of ODQ to 
these variables is less clear, as the size of the 
correlations change markedly when the 92 subjects are dropped 
from the study. When the full sample is included, ODQ 
correlates negatively with these measures in the Self-Aware 
condition; when partial sample is analyzed, ODQ correlates 
positively with the measures in the Anonymous condition. It 
is unclear what such findings mean other than that median 
split a n a l y s e s  on SDQ and ODQ w e r e  not l i k e l y  to y i e l d  m u c h  
in the way of significant findings, particularly if measures 
of superior self comparison are not affected by audience 
conditions. These measures of social desirability might be 
more useful in understanding the function of self-enhancing 
attributions. On the other hand, it might somehow be that 
there is some relationship between these variables that has
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not yet been understood fully. The evidence is too 
inconclusive to say at present. Further research needs to be 
done before these findings can be understood.
In conclusion, the present study has failed to show 
self-enhancing attributions for performance, but has shown 
some evidence of superior self comparison. No relationship 
has been established between variables of attribution and 
superior self comparison. Sex effects were shown to be 
present for measures of self-deception and impression 
management. Results involving analyses of variance by median 
split for variables of self-deception and impression 
m a n agement were mostly inconclusive. Further studies in this 
area might consider simplifying the audience conditions to 
include only public/anonymous conditions and increase cell 
size to help max i m i z e  liklihood of sho wing self-enhancing 
attributions. Furthermore, design considerations in this 
study have shown a need for a more adequate format so that 
subjects cannot as easily mistake their audience condition. 
Perhaps a videotaped presentation with a digital readout 
board for subjects' estimates would be a better plan, in 
order to eliminate mistaken impressions of subjects about 
their real audience condition. Finally, perhaps it would be 
better to administer need for social approval measures 
separately, under uniform conditions, to see if "base rates" 
of responding on such measures would be more useful in 
predicting subjects' responses than "manipulated rates."
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EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
The assistant greets subjects and records names for 
credit. The assistant then takes the subjects to the room 
and seats them one at a time. As they are seated, the 
assistant askes the subjects to do no talking and points out 
their seat position to them. Assistant places barrier 
between subjects and experimenter's position in place and 
then experimenter enters from the rear of the room and takes 
her position. Experimenter reads instructions.
Hello. I would like to thank you for coming. My name 
is Jane Harris. I am a clinical psychology student. Today 
you are participating in a psychology experiment which I am 
conducting for my master's thesis research project.
I am interested in studying the effects of group 
participation on performance, particularly as it relates to 
intelligence. You will be participating in a task which 
measures perceptual acuity. Perceptual acuity is the ability 
to notice fine detail and make quick but accurate judgments 
about aspects of a stimulus in a short period of time. This 
ability is related to nonverbal intelligence. In fact, the 
task on w h i c h  you w i l l  be w o r k i n g  t o d a y  has been t a k e n  f r o m  
the Leiter International Performance Scale, a test which 
measures nonverbal I. Q. This task has been validated in a\xn,umber of w a y s  by p s y c h o l o g i s t s  and is used as a qu i c k
98
measure to obtain an accurate and reliable index of nonverbal 
int e l l i g e n c e .
Perceptual acuity is one of a number of intellectual 
abilities which appear to be affected by group participation. 
It appears that the presence of other people improves our 
performance on many tasks. Such an effect is known as social 
facilitation. I will be looking at the effects of social 
facilitation on your performance.
It is i m p o r t a n t  that you give your best e f f o r t  on this 
task for the results of this study could have important 
implications for the manner in which we measure intelligence. 
Please give this experiment your best effort.
Let's continue. The perceptual acuity task on which you 
will be working is dot density estimation. You will be shown 
some slides on which there will be a single large square with 
a n u m b e r  of dot s s c a t t e r e d  a c r o s s  it. You w i l l  be s h o w n  each 
slide for 3 seconds. After viewing the slide, you will 
estimate the number of dots appearing on the slide and write 
that e s t i m a t e  d o w n  on one of the w h i t e  f o r m s  in f r o n t  of you. 
After you have completed your estimate, please place it on 
the box on the ta b l e  b e h i n d  the se c o n d  r o w  of c h a i r s  so that 
I may collect it. [In the private conditions, subjects were 
asked to place slip through slot in back of the experimental 
b o o t h . ]
I'd like to direct your attention to the materials in
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your packet. Each packet s h o u l d .contain a pencil, a red 
sheet and a packet of 12 forms, 3 of which are blanks. The 
blanks you will find at the back of your form packet. Please 
check now for these materials.
It is important that there is absolutely n_o talking 
during this experiment. If you have a question, please hold 
up your red sheet [place it in slot at back of booth] so I 
can see it, th e n  w r i t e  d o w n  your q u e s t i o n  on the bl a n k  paper 
provided for this purpose. Are there any questions at this 
time?
XXXPAUSE FOR QUESTIONS
[For the self aware condition the foll owing addition was 
made: It has been shown in past research that individuals' 
ability to per form the dot density estimation task is 
affected by looking into a mirror briefly before estimating 
the dots. Therefore, I would like you to locate the mirror 
placed in a holder at the side of your experimental booth. 
Please place it in your hand. What I would like you to do is 
to p l a c e  the m i r r o r  at eye l e v e l  w h e n  the p r o j e c t o r  c o m e s  on 
for the first time. Please look into the mirror for the full 
three seconds that the projector is on. Then the projector 
w i l l  go off and c o m e  on again, thi s t i m e  s h o w i n g  dots.
Please look at the dots for the full three seconds. When the 
projector light goes off, write down your estimate on the 
slip of paper for the trial. The sequence again is projector 
on, mirror three seconds, projector off, on, dots three
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seconds, projector off, write. Are there any questions?]
L e t ’s continue. Please look in front of you and find 
the form marked SAMPLE I.
XXXPAUSE
Pl a c e  it in front of you. I w i l l  n o w  s h o w  you the fi rst 
sample slide. Please look at the slide for the full 3 
seconds and try to estimate as accurately as possible the 
number of dots appearing in the square. Are there any 
questions?
XXXPAUSE FOR QUESTIONS 
If th e r e  are no q u e s t i o n s ,  we w i l l  begin. I w i l l  n o w  s h o w  
you sample slide 1.
XXXTURN ON PROJECTOR FOR 3 SECONDS 
Please write down your estimate of the number of dots 
appearing on the slide. When you have finished, place your 
form on the box behind you.
XXXPAUSE WHILE ESTIMATE IS MADE; PICK UP ESTIMATE, PLACE 
IN ESTIMATE HOLDER, QUICKLY COMPARE ESTIMATE TO ACTUAL 
NUMBER OF DOTS AND CORRECT CONFEDERATE'S TO PROPER 
NUMBER; RECORD ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR IN COLUMNS 
DESIGNATED FROM SEAT POSITION; TURN ON PROJECTOR 
I am placing the estimates on the overhead projector so that 
you can see how you have done on this first sample square. 
P l e a s e  n o t i c e  that your s c o r e  a p p e a r s  in the s a m e  p l a c e  as 
your seat position, so if you are in seat position A, your 
score will appear under A on the overhead. The actual number
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of dots on this slide are _____ . Please examine your estimate
to see how well you did on this judging.
XXXPAUSE FOR A MOMENT, THEN TURN OFF PROJECTOR 
We w i l l  n o w  m o v e  to the j u d g i n g  of S A M P L E  S Q U A R E  2. P l e a s e  
l o c a t e  the ca r d  tha t is n u m b e r e d ,  s a m p l e  s q u a r e  2 and pl a c e  
it in f r o n t  of you.
XXXPAUSE, PLACE SLIDE 2 IN PROJECTOR 
I w i l l  n o w  s h o w  you s a m p l e  s q u a r e  2. P l e a s e  e x a m i n e  it a g a i n  
carefully for the full three seconds.
XXXREPEAT FOR PROCESS FOR SAMPLE SQUARE 2
XXXREPEAT FOR SAMPLE SQUARE 3
You have now concluded the three sample squares. The 
actual trials will be identical to these. If you have 
questions to this point, please raise your red sheet, write 
d o w n  your q u e s t i o n  on a p i e c e  of p a p e r  a n d  I w i l l  a n s w e r  it 
for you if I can.
XXXPAUSE FOR QUESTIONS
Good. How a person feels can influence how they do on 
this task. Therefore, before you start the actual task, I 
would like you to fill out a brief questionnaire which 
indicates how you are currently feeling. I will now be 
passing out the questionnaire. When everyone has one, I 
will read the instructions with you.
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XXXPASS OUT QUESTIONNAIRE TO BOX, THEN READ INSTRUCTIONS
AT TOP.
Are there any questions? Rem e m b e r  to use the red sheet if 
you h a v e  any.
XXXPAUSE, PICK UP QUESTIONNAIRES
We will now proceed to the dot density estimation 
trials. I will show you each square once, just as in the 
s a m p l e  trials. A f t e r  e a c h  t r i a l  I w i l l  ask you to e s t i m a t e  
the n u m b e r  of dots and m a r k  your e s t i m a t e  d o w n  on the 
appropriate trial form. Please place the form on the box 
behind you as soon as you are done es timating the dots. Do 
not fill out the card until the projector light goes out.
Make sure to use the card which indicates which trial we are 
on presently. At the end of each trial I will pick up your 
estimates and record them on the overhead projector. Then I 
will tell you how many dots actually appeared on each slide. 
Are there any questions?
XXXPAUSE FOR QUESTIONS
Let's begin. This is trial _____ . Please locate your rating
card. I will now show you slide _____ .
XXXTURN ON PROJECTOR FOR 3 SECONDS 
P l e a s e  m a r k  yo u r  e s t i m a t e  on the ca rd and p l a c e  it in the box 
in f r o n t  of you.
XXXPAUSE, PICK UP ESTIMATES, CALCULATE CONFEDERATE
SCORE, WRITE ON OVERHEARD PROJECTOR AND TURN ON.
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These are your estimates on trial ____ .
XXXPAUSE, THEN TURN OFF. OVERHEAD PROJECTOR
Please locate card for trial _____ . I will now show you
slide ___.
XXXREPEAT FOR 6 TRIALS
You have now finished dot judging trials. Your score 
w i l l  be c a l c u l a t e d  by an a s s i s t a n t  in the n e x t  room. It w i l l  
take about 10 minutes to score your responses. While you are 
w a i t i n g  for your s c o r e s  to be c o m p u t e d ,  I a m  a s k i n g  you to 
fill out questionnaire which is part of another study here at 
the University. This will save some time and provide you 
w i t h  s o m e t h i n g  to do for the nex t f e w  m i n u t e s .  The 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e  you w i l l  be g i v e n  to fill out is being 
validated at this university. Bonnie Nussbaum, another 
graduate student here at the University of Montana, is
interested in looking at the frequency with which certain
types of items are endorsed on personality measures.
XXXPAUSE TO PASS OUT SDQ-ODQ 
Please read the instructions at the top of the questionnaire 
while I read them to you.
XXXREAD INSTRUCTIONS 
Are there any questions? Please check to see that you have 
four pages. Please fill out every item. When you are 
through, place the questionnaire face down and pass it to the
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back. Please continue to use the red sheet if you have 
q u e s t i o n s .
XXXPAUSE FOR QUESTIONS 
XXXPAUSE, THEN COLLECT SDQ-ODQ
ENTER ASSISTANT WITH SCORE SHEETS
Before I give you your scores, let me explain the scoring 
p r o c e d u r e s .
XXX DRAW BELL CURVE ON THE OVERHEAD PROJECTOR 
A score on the perceptual acuity, i.e, dot density estimation 
task, could range from 100 to 200 points. Persons of average 
ability score about 150 points or at the 50th percentile—  
about here. A person with a score of 199 points would score 
at the 99th percentile, or would do better than 99 percent of 
the people doing this task, and would fall about here on the 
bell curve. You will find your score in the envelopes.
Please do not discuss your score at this time.
XXXPAUSE, PASS OUT SCORES 
You m a y  e x a m i n e  you r s c o r e  at this time.
Please place your feedback sheet back in the envelop and 
place it behind you on the box.
I will now be passing out a questionnaire. Please read 
the instructions at the top. Are there any questions?
XXXPAUSE TO PASS OUT QUESTIONNAIRE, WAIT FOR QUESTIONS 
READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE ALOUD
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Please fill out the questionnaire and place it in the box 
behind you.
XXXPAUSE, THEN PICK UP QUESTIONNAIRE
I will now be passing out a questionnaire designed to 
get some information about the procedures used in this study. 
Please read the instructions and answer as carefully as you 
can. Place it in the box when you finish.
XXXPAUSE TO PASS OUT MANIPULATION CHECK, READ 
INSTRUCTIONS ALOUD, THEN PICK UP THE MANIPULATION CHECK
APPENDIX B 
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The following rating form will be provided to subjects 
for each trial of dot judging.
r -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  — ^
SUBJECT NO. 
*Trial Number
What is your estimate of the 
number of dots on this slide?
APPENDIX C
EXPECTANCY QUESTIONNAIRE
108
109
The following questions relate to the three sample 
squares which you just finished judging. Information gained 
from these questions is used to improve my procedures.
Please answer these questions as thoughtfully and accurately 
as possible. Your answers are anonymous. Do not put your 
name on this questionnaire. Please circle the number of the 
answer which most agrees with your opinion.
1. How difficult was judging the first sample square for 
you?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 +3 +4
very
difficult
somewhat
difficult
uncertain somewhat
easy
very
easy
How difficult was judging the second 
you?
sample square f or
-4 -3 -2 -1
$
0 +1 + 2 +3 + 4
very
difficult
somewhat
difficult
uncertain somewhat
easy
very
easy
How difficult was judging 
you?
; the third sample square for
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2 +3 +4
very
difficult
somewhat 
dif ficult
uncertain somewhat
easy
very
easy
How difficult overall does dot judging appear to be 
you at this time?
to
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very
difficult
somewhat
difficult
uncertain somewhat
easy
very
easy
If all subsequent dot judging examples were similar in 
difficulty to the sample squares, how well do you think 
you might do on this task, based on your experience so 
far?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very somewhat uncertain somewhat very
poorly poorly well well
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5. In your opinion, what role does accuracy play 
in succeeding at this task?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very somewhat uncertain somewhat very
unimportant unimportant important important
6. How important do you think level of intelligence is 
considered in our society?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very somewhat uncertain somewhat very
unimportant unimportant important important
7. If an individual could choose to have any level of
intelligence he/she desired, how much do you think most 
people would choose to have?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2  +3 +4
very somewhat average somewhat very
low low high high
8. If as above, you could choose any level of intelligence 
for yourself, how much would you choose to have?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very somewhat average very very
low low high high
9, Nonverbal I. Q, is an important concept in psychology.
It must be measured in some manner without using words as 
part of the task. Dot judging is one way to measure such
I. Q. What is your opinion of using dot judging to 
measure nonverbal I. Q.?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
very somewhat average somewhat very
low low high high
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Read each question briefly. Please circle the number of the 
answer which most generally applies to you.
Not
at
All
2
2
Somewhat
3
3
4
4
5
5
Very
Much
So
6
6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
SDQ
1. Have you ever felt hatred 
toward any of your parents?
2. Do you ever feel guilty?
3. Does every attractive 
person of the opposite 
sex turn you on?
4. Have you ever felt like 
you want to kill somebody?
5. Do you ever get angry?
6. Do you have thoughts that
you d o n ’t want other people 
to know that you have?
7. Do you ever feel attracted
to people of the same sex?--
8. Have you ever made a fool 
of yourself?
9. Are there any things in 
your life which make you 
unhappy?
10. Is it important to you that 
other people think highly 
of you?
11. W o u l d  you lik e to k n o w  w h a t  
other people think about 
you?
12. Were your parents ever mean 
to you?
13. Do you have any bad 
memories?
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Very
Much
Somewhat So
3 4 5 6 7 14. Have you ever thought that
your parents hated you?
3 4 5 6 7 15. Do you have sexual
fantasies?
3 4 5 6 7 16. Have you ever been
uncertain as to whether or 
not you are homosexual?
3 4 5 6 7 17. Have you ever doubted your
sexual adequacy?
3 4 5 6 7 18. Have you ever enjoyed your
bowel movements?
3 4 5 6 7 19. Have you ever wanted to
rape or be raped by 
someone?
3 4 5 6 7 20. Have you ever thought of
committing suicide in order 
to get back at somebody?
APPENDIX E
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Read each question briefly. Please circle the number of the 
answer which most generally applies to you.
ODQ
Never Sometimes Always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1. Do you apologize to others
for your mistakes?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 2. Are you knowledgable about
things you talk about?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3. When you hear people
gossiping do you try not 
to listen?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  4. Do you always throw your
litter into waste baskets 
on the street?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  5. Are you honest?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 6. If you say you will do
something, do you keep 
your promises, no matter 
how inconvenient it might 
be to do so?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  7. When you take a sick-leave
from work or school, are 
you as sick as you say you 
are?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8. Do you show respect for
older people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  9. Are you in control of your
temper?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10. Are you loyal to your
friends?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 11. Do you like all the people
you know?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 12. Would you declare
everything at customs, 
e v e n  if you k n e w  that you 
could never be found out?
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Never Sometimes Always
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 13. Have all your habits been
good and desirable ones?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 14. Do you tell the truth?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 15. Are you on tim e for
appointments or work?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 16. Do you obey traffic
regulations (including 
jay - w a l k i n g )?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 17. When you were a child did
you obey you parents?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 18. Are you fair in your
judgments of others?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 19. Are you polite and
understanding toward other 
people?
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 20. Are you willing to let
people know about all your 
thoughts and ideas?
APPENDIX F 
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Subject Code NO___
Your score is __________ .
According to the group norms developed in conjunction 
with the Leiter International Performance Scale of nonverbal
intelligence, you have scored in the _______  percentile of
performance. This score means that you have shown better
ability on this task than _______  of individuals
who have performed this task. The average individual scores 
at a b o u t  150 p o i n t s  or at the 50th p e r c e n t i l e  w h e n  
performing this task individually. It has been found that 
this task is importantly related to nonverbal I. Q.
50
APPENDIX G
DEPENDENT VARIABLE QUESTIONNAIRE
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You have now completed the dot density estimation task. 
The following questions are questions concerning the task.
The information collected from these questionnaires will be 
published, so any errors in this information may cause others 
to draw incorrect conclusions about important factors.
Please be thoughtful and accurate in answering. Remember 
tha t your a n s w e r s  are a n o n y m o u s .  Do not put your n a m e  on 
this questionnaire.
Below are four scales. Please read each one and then 
circle the answer that best agrees with your opinion.
1. In my opinion, performance on the 
required ability.
dot judging task
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 +3
strongly
disagree
uncertain strongly
agree
2. In my opinion, 
requireseffort
performance on the
•
dot judging task
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
strongly
disagree
uncertain strongly
agree
3. In my opinion, performance on the 
depended on task difficulty.
dot judging task
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
strongly
disagree
uncertain strongly
agree
4. In my opinion, performance on the 
depended on luck.
dot judging task
-3 -2 -1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3
strongly
disagree
uncertain strongly
agree
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5. During the dot density estimation task you were able to 
see the answers of each participant. On the scale below, 
p l e a s e  rank in or d e r  the m e m b e r s  of your g r o u p  on 
accuracy to perform the task, as you noticed it. Please 
use e a c h  person's seat p o s i t i o n  (A, B, C, D, E) to 
identify them. Include yourself in the ranking.
EXAMPLE: if your seat position was D
5 most accurate A_____
4 C
3 D
2 B
1 least accurate E
5 most accurate 
4
3
2
1 least accurate______
6. Please circle the number which best represents you in 
comparison with "the average group member".
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
much less somewhat same somewhat much more
ability less abiity . more ability
ability ability
7. Please circle the number which best represents you in 
comparison to the "average college student."
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
<you would rank yourself
here in this case if you 
were sitting in seat D
and you consider your­
self worse than two
people and better than 
two people.
much less somewhat same somewhat much more
ability less abiity more ability
ability ability
122
8. Please circle the number wich best represents you in 
comparison to the "average person in the population."
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
much less somewhat same somewhat much more
ability less abiity more ability
ability ability
9. Please indicate whether you are
Male Female (Circle 1)
10. Please indicate your age_____________.
11. Please indicate year in school Freshman 
(Circle one) Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Other
APPENDIX H 
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The following questions relate to the study in which you 
have just participated. Information gained from these 
questions will also be used to improve my procedures. Again, 
I w o u l d  lik e to ask you to a n s w e r  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n  as 
thoughtfully and accurately as possible. Please circle the 
answer which best agrees with your opinion.
Some conditions in this study are different than others. 
Please answer these questions about the situation in which 
you participated.
1. Did you t h i n k  that you w e r e  ab l e  to p a r t i c i p a t e  
unobserved by the other participants in this study?
YES NO
2. Did you t h i n k  that you w e r e  ab l e  to be d i r e c t l y  o b s e r v e d  
by other subjects while participating in this study, 
i.e., could they see you while you were working on the 
task?
YES NO
3. Did it seem to you that the experimenter could see you 
during the experiment?
YES NO
4. Was there an observer standing in the room during the 
study?
YES NO
5. During the study, you were given feedback as to how well 
you performed on a dot judging task, including a 
percentile score. Please place a small X above your 
percentile score on the following scale:
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
percentiles
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6. Why is group performance important on the dot density 
estimation task, according to social facilitation 
theory,i.e., group performance, as explained by the 
experimenter ?
a. It increases ability and improves accuracy.
b. It decreases ability and interfers with performance.
c. It has no effect on ability or accuracy.
7. Students read that subjects in experimental studies are
often subject to deception. Did you at any time feel 
that the exp erimenter was trying to deceive you? Yes No 
If so, in what way?________________________________________________
8. Subjects in experimental studies s o metimes develop their 
own hypotheses about what the experimenter is testing.
If you have done so, plese briefly describe what you feel 
the exp erimenter might have been testing.
APPENDIX I 
DEBRIEFING INSTRUCTIONS
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You have finished with your task for today. Before you 
go, I would like to provide you with some information about 
the research I am conducting so that you might learn from 
your experience here. This research is part of a study being 
done for my m a s t e r ’s thesis in psychology.
This area of research is called person perception. It 
is concerned with how humans process information about 
themselves and other people. The central focus of my study 
is to i d e n t i f y  r u l e s  we  use to or d e r  and p r e d i c t  our 
environment. Such environmental events include our own 
behavior as well as interpersonal processes in which we 
become engaged. The study in which you participated today 
was designed to examine what kind of interpersonal comparison 
processes take place with us when we are given certain types 
of feedback about our performances. Some studies have shown 
that people respond differently in making explanations of 
their own behavior and in comparing the behavior of other 
people depending on whether they feel they have been 
successful or failed at a task.
In the last part of the study you w e r e  a s k e d  to i n d i c a t e  
if you felt that deception was involved in this experiment.
It is very i m p o r t a n t  that you r e a l i z e  that w h i l e  the task in 
which you participated, i.e., dot density es timation is 
similar to nonverbal I.Q. tasks, that was not the purpose of 
using this task in our study. Furthermore, the feedback you 
received about your performance was not accurate but
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arbitrarily assigned to you. The test is bogus. It reflects 
nothing about your intellectual abilities. The feedback you 
received was prearranged and had no relationship to your 
abilities or performance. It can be very uncomfortable to 
realize that you have been mislead in an experiment by the 
experimenter. Unfortunately there seems to be no other way 
to get at this kind of information. If you think about it 
for a m o m e n t ,  you can p r o b a b l y  see that in o r d e r  to get 
individuals to respond realistically to a task in an 
experiment, you have to make them believe that the situation 
is realistic. Please realize that being mislead in an 
experiment is no reflection on your abilities or 
characteristics. Once again, I would like to repeat that 
your performance feedback on this test bears no relationship 
to your intellectual abilities.
Past research in psychology tells us that even though 
subjects are told that their behaviors really do not reflect 
on their abilities, subjects still leave the experiment room 
thinking that they have performed well or poorly on the task. 
You n e e d  to k n o w  this m i g h t  h a p p e n  to you and s h o u l d  g u a r d  
against such occurrences by consciously remi nding yourself 
that this exp eriment does not measure or represent any real 
ability. Your results were predetermined and randomly 
assigned to you. R e m e m b e r  that they do not indicate anything 
about your real abilities.
Since I am running more subjects in the same experiment,
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it is ver y i m p o r t a n t  that you do not tal k to o t h e r s  about 
your experience here today. If others come knowing what I am 
planning to do, they won't respond naturally and the data 
collected won't show an accurate picture. Much time and 
effort has already been expended in this project and I ask 
for your cooperation in this matter. Do you agree not to talk 
to others about this research?
XXXHAVE THEM NOD THEIR HEADS OR VERBALLY RESPOND.
If you w o u l d  like m o r e  d e t a i l s  a b o u t  this st u d y  I w o u l d  
be h a p p y  to d i s c u s s  it w i t h  you a f t e r  thi s m e e t i n g ,  or I can 
usually be found in my office, Room 213 in this building 
during the day. I would be happy to provide you with further 
information. Do you have any brief questions before you 
leave?
I w o u l d  like to t h a n k  all of you very m u c h  for 
participating today. I really value your help.
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To: Chairman, Institutional Review Board, for the Use of
Human Subjects in Research 
FromiJane L. Harris, Graduate Sfudent in Clinical Psychology, 
and Dr. Arthur L. Beaman, Ph.d. (Faculty Supervisor)
RE: Request of approval involving human subjects. Title of
project: Self Enhancement Attributions. Superior
Conformity of Self Comparisons and Social D e s i r a b i l i t y : 
Study of Relations
D a t e :
1. The overall objective of this research is to examine the 
a r e a  of s e l f - s e r v i n g  bi a s  and h o w  it r e l a t e s  to the 
comparison of self to others. It is the further objective of 
this study to understand how self-serving attributions and 
c o m p a r i s o n  of self to o t h e r s  is a f f e c t e d  by a n e e d  for s o c i a l  
approval. Specific questions to be examined are: 1) How does 
varying the nature of audience (anonymous, self-aware, aware 
of others, aware of observers) affect attribution of success 
and failure? 2) How is self-other comparison affected by 
changes in audience? 3) Wha t is the relationship between 
self-serving attributions and the tendency to see oneself as 
more in conformity with the norms than one sees others to be? 
4) How are self-serving attributions and superior conformity 
of self comparisons related to needs for social approval? To 
achieve these ends, one hundred and ninety six introductory 
psychology students will be randomly assigned to one of eight 
experimental conditions. Subjects will be tested in groups 
of four with one confederate included in each group. 
Independents variables to be manipulated are level of 
audience awareness and infor mation feedback about success or 
failure on a perceptual task related to intelligence. All 
groups will be asked to fill out questionnaires asking them 
to assess internal/external attributions for succ e s s / f a i l u r e , 
make self-other comparisons, and fill out inventories 
designed to assess need for social approval. Deception will 
be used to disguise the nature of experimental focus. 
Debriefing will be done imm e d i a t e l y  following data collection.
Information gained from subjects will be used to further 
understanding in social psychology, particularly in the area 
of attribution and social comparison.
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2. The subjects in the present study will benefit from this 
research in that it will result in an educational experience, 
both by providing the student with direct experience with a 
social psychology experiment and by providing the student 
with additional information about the area of person 
perception. The results of this study will allow a better 
understanding of the manner in which individuals attribute 
own success/failure and how they compare themselves to others 
on important variables. Such findings are important not only 
because they relate two parallel areas of social psychology 
previously considered separate but because understanding of 
the manner in which self attributions and self comparions are 
made will help psychologists to further understand how self 
esteem and social functioning are related. In this respect, 
it will benefit scientific knowledge in the area 
significantly.
3. Subjects will be asked to perform a dot judging task under 
various public/private conditions. They then will be given 
bogus feedback about their performance (success/failure). 
Following feedback, subjects will be asked to fill out 
several paper and pencil measures of the impressions of own 
and ot h e r s ’ performance. Subjects will then be debriefed.
4. Subjects will be 192 undergraduate students enrolled in 
Psychology 110 and should range in age from 18-24, 
approximately. As such, they should fall within the normal 
r a n g e s  of the p o p u l a t i o n  and w o u l d  not l i k e l y  to be 
considered vulnerable in the accepted sense of the word.
5. The subjects may be exposed to some brief discomfort, in 
that a deception regarding the nature of the task and false 
feedback are proposed. Subjects will be told that they will 
be engaging in a task which demonstrates a type of nonverbal 
intelligence. They will then receive feedback about their 
success or failure on the task. It is possible that some 
subjects could find this slightly uncomfortable. Past 
studies in this area have successfully used deception 
frequently. No deleterious effects on the part of subjects 
have been reported in the literature of this area. Attempts 
to locate such results have met with little success, thus it 
is d i f f i c u l t  to say for c e r t a i n  w h a t  e f f e c t s  m i g h t  be on 
subjects.
6. As soon as is possible, subjects will be debriefed, 
therefore limiting the period of deception to as brief a 
period as possible. Thourough measures will be taken to 
insure that subjects understand that their performance on the 
task has no relationship to their level of intelligence, that 
deception was necessary to elicit the behaviors in question, 
and that being deceived in an experimental study in no way 
reflects on competency or personality characteristics of
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subjects participating in the study.
7. Subjects' responses will be anonymous not only for 
purposes of confidentiality but because the nature of the 
study requires it. An experimental assistant will take names 
of subjects at the beginning of the experiment for 
bookkeeping purposes, then subjects will be randomly assigned 
to an experimental code number. After this is done, even the 
experimenter will not be able to identify responses of a 
particular individual.
S. N/A
9. A waiver of consent is applied for, because this study 
does not appear to involve risk to the subject. Previous 
studies appearing in the literature of this area, of which 
there are many, have reported no risk with this type of 
experimental paradigm.
10.The results of this study will be made available to the 
students who are interested.
TABLE 1
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Table 1
Variable: Predicted Difficulty of Future Dot Judging:
Control of Standard Value*
Public Public-Observer
Success. Failure Success Failure
Sex
Male
Female
1.35 NS** 
.98 NS
-.36 NS 
1.58 NS
Male 1.22 NS 
Female 2.20 NS
.98 NS 
1.72 NS
Anonymous
Success Failure
Self-Aware
Success Failure
Sex
Male
Female
.61 NS 
.98 NS
1.95 NS 
1.91 NS
Male 1.58 NS 
Female .50 NS
2.45 NS 
.36 NS
♦Formula: t_ = cell mean - 0 _t > 3.28 = significance/C 2) (MSE) cell n
**NS (nonsignificant)
TABLE 2
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Table 2
Variable: ATTRIB:T Values for Dunnett's Tests for 
Comparing T r e a t m e n t s w i t h  a Control of Standard Value*
Public
Failure
Public-Observer
FailureSuccess Success
Sex
Male 1.38 NS** 
Female 1.63 NS
-.20 NS 
.74 NS
Male .26 NS 
Female 1.82 NS
1.21 NS 
.06 NS
Anonymous Self-Aware
Success Failure Success Failure
Sex
Male .54 NS .74 NS Male 1.56 NS .00 NS
Female 1.08 NS .13 NS Female .54 NS .95 NS
^Formula: _t = cell mean - 0 t > 3.28 = significance
. An, .(MSEi
v  cell jn
**NS (nonsignificant)
TABLE 3
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Table 3A
Variable SDQ: Cell Means for a Two (Male/Female) by Four 
(Public, Publ i c - O b s e r v e r , Anonymous, Self-Aware) ANOVA
Condition
Public Public-Observer Anoymous Self-Aware
Sex
Male 7.70 7.79 
Female 8.88 7.96
6.79
8.67
7.29
7.50
Main effect Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sign, of F 
Sex 34.953 1 34.953 4.152 .043
Table 3B
Variable ODQ: Cell Means for a Two (Male/Female) by Four
(Public, Public-Observer, Anonymous , Self-Aware) ANOVA
Condition
Public Public-Observer Anoymous Self-Aware
Sex
Male 7.67 7.75 
Female 8.71 9.46
6.79
8.33
7.92
8.96
Main effect Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sign, of F 
Sex 85.333 1 85.333 6.771 .010
TABLE
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Table 4
Pearson Product Moment Correlations on Variables ATTRIB,
PIP. PIPGROUP, P I P C Q L L G . and PIPPERS
Male
Condition Public
Success Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT .50
(.04)
-.33 
*( .14)
-.25 
( . 22)
-.13
(.34)
.29 .09 
(.19) (.40)
-.21
(.26)
.02
(.48)
PIP -.49
(.05)
-.45
(.07)
-.28
(.19)
-.12
(.36)
-.05
(.44)
-.14
(.34)
PIPGRP .55
(.03)
.55
(.03)
.74
(.00)
.68
(.00)
PIPCO .90
(.00)
.70
(.00)
Male
Condition o 'Public-Observer
Success Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT -.23
(.23)
.11
(.37)
-.24
(.23)
-.33
(.15)
.66 -.09 
(.01) (.38)
.15
(.32)
.02
(.47)
PIP -.24
(.22)
-.44
(.08)
-.46
(.06)
-.59
(.02)
-.36
(.12)
-.42
(.09)
PIPGRP .72
(.00)
.63
(.01)
.74
(.03)
.84
(.01)
PIPCO .94
(.00)
.86
(.00)
(Table 4 continues)
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Table 4 (continued)
Pearson Product Moment Correlations on Variables ATTRIB,
PIP, PIPGROUP, PIPCQLLG, and PIPPERS
Male
Condition Anonymous
Success   Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT ,44 -.04 -.28 -.38 -.21 .28 .03 .19
( .0 8 ) * < .45) ( .25) (.11) (.11) (.15) (.44) (.40)
PIP -.37 -.36 -.32 -.31 -.34 -.70
(.12) (.13) (.19) (.16) (.14) (.00)
PIPGRP .43 .52 .80 .73
(.08) ( .03) (.00) (.00)
PIPCO .84 .85
(.00) (.00)
Male
Condition Self-Aware
Success _̂_    Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT -.38
(.11)
.50
(.05)
.04
(.44)
.08
(.40)
-.28 .06 
(.19) (.42)
.21
(.25)
.30
(.17)
PIP, -.49
(.05)
-.39
(.08)
-.30
(.16)
-.80
(.02)
-.74
(.12)
-.76
(.09)
PIPGRP .68
(.00)
,66
(.00)
.87
(.00)
.82
(.00)
PIPCO .85
(.00)
.95
(.00)
(Table 4 continues)
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Table 4 (continued)
Pearson Product Moment Correlations on Variables ATTRIB,
P I P . P1PGR0UP. PIPCOLLG. and PIPPERS
Female
Condition* Public
_______ Success Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT .11 .68 .45 .25 -.06 -.46 .27 .09
( .38)*(.00) (.07) (.22) (.42) (.06) (.20) (.38)
PIP -.12 -.23 -.31 -.10 -.08 -.26
(.35) (.24) (.16) ( .38) (.40) (.21)
PIPGRP .88 .82 .25 .15
(.00) (.00) (.21) (.31)
PIPCO .89 .75
(.00) (.00)
Female
Condition Public-Observer
_______ Success  Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT .26
(.21)
.24
(.22)
-.07
(.41)
-.08
(.39)
-.37 -.32 
(.12) (.16)
.02
(.48)
.17
(.31)
PIP -.09
(.38)
-.45
(.07)
-.26
(.20)
-.17
(.31)
-.08
(.40)
-.07
(.42)
PIPGRP .44
(.07)
.41
(.04)
.01
(.48)
.09
(.38)
PIPCO .91
(.00)
.86
(.00)
(Table 4 continues)
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Table 4 (continued)
Pearson Product Moment Correlations on Variables ATTRIB,
PIP. PIPGROUP. P I P C O L L G , and PIPPERS
Condition
F emale
Anonymous
Success Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT
(
.35 -.39 
.01)*(.10)
-.70
(.00)
-.68
(.00)
-.26 .30 
(.21) (.17)
-.11
(.37)
-.22
(.24)
PIP -.26
(.20)
-.61
(.02)
-r. 63 
(.01)
-.26
(.20)
-.51
(.05)
-.42
(.09)
PIPGRP .62
(.08)
.57
(.03)
.53
(.03)
.42
(.08)
PIPCO .93 
( .00)
.91
(.00)
Female
Condition Self-Aware
Success Failure
PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS PIP PIPGRP PIPCO PIPPERS
ATT
(
.40 .12 
.10) (.34)
-.13
(.34)
-.08
(.39)
.05 .51 
(.44) (.05)
-.26
(.20)
-.05
(.43)
PIP -.58
(.02)
-.72
(.00)
-.69
(.00)
-.52
(.04)
-.39
(.11)
-.37
(.11)
PIPGRP .79
(.07)
.78
(.04)
.47
(.06)
.74
(.00)
PIPCO .98
(.00)
.84
(.00)
♦Indicates significance level
TABLE 5
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Table 5
Pearson Product Moment Correlations: SDQ with ATTRIB, PIP,
PIPGROUP. PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS, Full Sample
Condition
ATTRIB PIP PIPGROUP PIPCOLLG PIPPERS
Public .16 -.07 -.11 .07 -.09
( .13)* (.31) (.22) (.31) (.27)
Public- -.06 .17 -.10 -.28 -.32
Observer (.35) (.12) (.25) (.03) (.02)
Anonymous .28 .05 -.07 -.19 -.22
(.03) (.35) (.32) (.10) (.07)
Self-Aware -.07 .09 .07 -.03 -.05
(.32) (.27) (.31) (.41) (.36)
* significance level of the correlation coefficient
TABLE 6
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Table 6
Pearson Product Moment Correlations: SDQ with A T T R I B , P I P ,
PIPGROUP. PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS. Partial Sample
Condition
ATTRIB PIP PIPGROUP PIPCOLLG PIPPERS
Public .10 
( .37)*
-.30
(.16)
.11
(.35)
.35
(.11)
-.11
(.37)
Public- -.10 .53 -.38 -.73 -.57
Observer (.38) (.04) ( .13) (.01) (.04)
Anonymous .28
(.05)
.21
(.10)
-.35
(.02)
-.38
(.01)
-.41 
( .01)
Self-Aware .02
(.A3)
.23
(.07)
.02
(.43)
-.07
(.33)
-.07
(.32)
* significance level of the correlation coefficient
TABLE 7
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Table 7
Pearson Product Moment Correlations: ODQ with ATTRIB, PIP,
PIPGROUP, PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS, Full Sample
Condition
ATTRIB PIP PIPGROUP PIPCOLLG PIPPERS
Public .06 -.02 .11 .18 .01
(.35)* ( .08) (.25) ( .11) (.47)
Public- -.18 . 13 .04 -.04 -.06
Observer (.10) (.19) ( .39) ( . 37) (.34)
Anonymous .22 -.08 .19 .24 .17
(.07) (.29) (.09) (.05) (.13)
Self-Aware -.11 .37 -.25 -.23 -.23
(.23) (.01) (.04) (.05) (.05)
* significance level of the correlation coefficient
TABLE 8
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Table 8
Pearson Product Moment Correlations: QDQ with ATTRIB, PIP,
PIPGROUP. PIPCOLLG and PIPPERS, Partial Sample
Condition
ATTRIB PIP PIPGROUP PIPCOLLG PIPPERS
Public -.38 .39 -.26 -.60 -.46
( .12)* ( .11) (.23) (.02) (.09)
Public- .21 -.02 -.04 .15 .05
Observer (.10) (.44) (.39) (.20) (.38)
Anonymous -.14 .43 -.31 -.26 -.27
(.18) (.00) (.03) (.05) (.04)
Self-Aware -.12 .37 -.05 -.12 .29
(.34) (.11) (.43) (.34) (.16)
* significance level of the correlation coefficient
